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The LBJ School of Public Affairs, ranked No. 8 in the nation among graduate public 
affairs schools, makes a difference, not only within the walls of academia, but also in the 
public and social dialogue of the world. Contributing viable solutions to society is the 
LBJ School’s legacy and its benchmark. Its effectiveness in channeling the purpose and 
passion of students into professional careers is evident in the success of more than 4,500 
graduates who are the living legacy of President Johnson’s bold and fearless action. The 
University of Texas at Austin is home to the LBJ School.
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Introduction
STEVEN W. PEDIGO
 In 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson shared his vision of what would 
become known as the “Great Society”—an America where the air and water are clean, 
poverty and racial injustice have been eliminated, and all its citizens can develop their full 
potential and share in the abundance. Tragically, the gap between LBJ’s aspiration and 
our current reality is as wide today as it was then. The ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic 
and the ensuing economic calamity shed a blinding light on our continuing need to create 
more equitable communities, preserve the planet, and nourish the minds of our children. 
While LBJ couched his dream in the metaphors of battle and transcendence, the word that 
best describes our society’s need today is resilience. 
The concept of resilience grows out of a long tradition of emergency management.1 The 
more resiliency a community has, the less likely it is to break under pressure and the faster 
it rebounds. Typically, the word is used to assess a community’s capacity to withstand 
an environmental disaster, but it can also describe the ability of a community to cope 
with crises like pandemics and economic shocks. Where the COVID-19 emergency is 
concerned, resiliency is less about “bouncing back” than “moving forward.” The concept 
is best understood through what John Kingdon calls the “policy stream”—the ways that 
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problems, politics, and policies intersect to define where a community is, how it responds, 
and how it grows through a crisis.2 This understanding cannot be achieved without a frank 
evaluation of the system flaws the crisis exposes, which need to be repaired as a crucial 
step toward restoration.  
Resiliency as a Policy Tool
That critical evaluation—and a toolkit for addressing those repairs—is precisely what we 
have undertaken in these pages. Tapping into the expertise of our faculty and scholars, the 
essays in this toolkit offer both a diagnosis of where the Austin region, America, and the 
world went wrong in its handling of the COVID-19 crisis, and a prescription for what it can 
do better. 
Topics covered include:
• Equity, including the ways that the virus and strategies for treating it impact 
different populations
• Public Finance, how federal governments can supplement state revenues in crises—
and how states can maximize their revenues by different funding approaches 
• Corrections, and more particularly, the scandal of COVID-19 in prisons, and the 
dangers it poses not just to prisoners, but also to their guards and their communities
• Intelligence, how the intelligence community delivered good information about the 
threat of the pandemic but failed to get federal decision makers to act on it
• National Security, how the US, despite its manifest failures, could reclaim its status 
as a world leader
• Public Health, samples of approaches that ensure that the most vulnerable 
populations receive all the help they are entitled to
• Community Building, and the importance of collaboration between nonprofits and the 
public sector, and among nonprofits themselves
There are also important essays that highlight the role of public management education 
in developing effective leaders, global development and the stresses that COVID-19 is 
creating in the developing world, economic development and inclusion, community health, 
and how COVID-19 foreshadows the coming shocks borne of climate change. Together, 
While LBJ couched his dream in the 
metaphors of battle and transcendence, 
the word that best describes our society’s 
need today is resilience.
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they make a powerful case for the value of evidence-based research and thinking in the 
service of policy-making—and the clear need for greater expertise in state houses, in 
Washington, DC, and at private philanthropies and NGOs.
Fifty years ago, LBJ founded our school and introduced its first public affairs graduate 
program as one that would blend the practical with the academic to produce a new 
generation of “thinkers and doers: people who dream of progress and who will try to turn 
those dreams into achievements.” This toolkit was produced in that spirit, to not only help 
policymakers as they struggle to turn their good intentions into effective actions, but also 
to put the issue of equitable community development and LBJ’s vision of the Great Society 
back on the national agenda.
Steven Pedigo is a professor of practice at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The 
University of Texas at Austin. He directs the School’s Urban Lab.
Thinkers and doers: people who
dream of progress and who will







 9 • RESILIENCY IN THE AGE OF COVID-19
The Reckoning:
a New Role for Schools
of Public Affairs
ANGELA M. EVANS
 Given the clear evidence of our government’s failures, we as schools of 
public affairs are facing an existential reckoning. COVID-19’s threat to public health, the 
drumbeat of revelations of social injustices, the economic devastation experienced by 
millions of Americans, and the fear and doubt surrounding the integrity of our most sacred 
of rights—the right to vote—have rightfully cast doubt on the preparedness and integrity of 
our public services. It is imperative that we act to restore confidence in the public service 
corps by cultivating a new generation of talent that can rise to these challenges. 
 
The major disruptions we face are not momentary, and the adjustments we have to make 
are not fleeting. We are living through a clear test of our foundational institutions and the 
values we hold as Americans. Actively assessing our failures in real time is important, 
but it is not enough. We have to fix these errors. We also have to acknowledge the things 
that give us reason for hope. People have rallied; they have collaborated, innovated, and 
sacrificed. They have taken care of each other and found ways to advance the public good. 
 
While uncertainty remains, a path for the future has emerged. We know what problems 
exist, we know we have to address them, and we know we have the capacity to solve them. 
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The past cannot be prologue. Our complacency has made us complicit to the extent that 
we failed to promote the exchanges of knowledge and expertise between ourselves and 
policy communities that would have improved their responses.
 
Now is the time for schools of public affairs to step up and ensure that going forward, the 
public service is supplied and refreshed with expertise that is matched to the demands of 
self-government. We need to welcome new ideas and discard old ones. And we need to do 
this quickly—managing risk and anticipating mistakes.
 
The LBJ School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin is well-positioned 
to lead this necessary transformation. In its fifty years, it has consistently maintained a 
balance of research and scholarship and practical expertise, ensuring that its programs 
are well-grounded, workable, and relevant. We have set a singular example by producing 
rich scholarship and moving that scholarship through the halls of policymaking. This 
legacy will serve us well as we embark on this new mission. We must leave behind the “as it 
was,” work through the “as it is now,” and design the “as it could be.” We must do this by not 
only being open to but also eager to change how and where we teach, what we teach, and 
whom we teach.
How We Teach
The pandemic has clearly demonstrated that schools can change the ways they teach. 
Within two weeks of campus closure, the school moved from regularly scheduled in-
person class meetings to a fully remote, virtual platform. Not perfect and not without 
limitations, the transition demonstrated the power of flexibility and sheer will. 
Through trial and error, we discovered a number of innovative teaching techniques that 
virtual platforms make possible. While some degree of in-person learning is needed to 
achieve student engagement, critical thinking, and speaking skills, the use of remote and 
virtual platforms also has distinct advantages. 
Now is the time for schools of public 
affairs to step up and ensure that going 
forward, the public service is supplied and 
refreshed with expertise that is matched 
to the demands of self-government.
“
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Virtual learning expands the notion of the classroom. Classes can take place anywhere, 
and participants can be everywhere. The physical plant of the school became less 
important as a core requirement of learning—thus opening up the possibility of “holding 
class” in places aligned with course content, such as organizations and governments that 
apply the subject matter in their daily operations. Classes on public financial management, 
for example, could be offered to city, county, and state officials, creating opportunities to 
integrate students and practitioners.
Remote platforms also offer opportunities to expand the expertise and capacity available 
to faculty, students, and staff. It is much easier to invite experts and practitioners to 
participate in remote/virtual programs and activities, as they are not required to visit the 
Austin campus.
Another unanticipated outcome of the shift to virtual platforms were the many formal and 
informal collaborations among faculty. These not only enlivened and improved the learning 
experience for students, but also led to the creation of groups and spaces in which faculty 
and practitioners can share best practices and experiences.
What We Teach
Course catalogs reflect not only what the school deems essential for the completion of a 
program of study, but also what can launch graduates into their chosen careers. 
The principles upon which these courses are designed and chosen should be clearly 
stated, to maintain focus and ensure that students choose the courses most relevant to 
their needs. Many sets of principles exist. One set offered by Ernest Boyer, a renowned 
educator who served as Chancellor of the State University of New York, United 
States Commissioner of Education, and President of the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching, is especially resonant today. The first five are his own words; I 
have added the sixth to emphasize current conditions: 
• The scholarship of discovery: the pursuit of inquiry and investigation in search 
of new knowledge
• The scholarship of integration: making connections across disciplines and 
advancing knowledge through synthesis
• The scholarship of application: applying knowledge to the social issues of the times 
in a dynamic process that generates and tests new theory and knowledge
• The scholarship of teaching: transmitting knowledge and also transforming and 
extending it
• The scholarship of engagement: connecting any of the above dimensions of 
scholarship to the understanding and solving of pressing social, civic, and 
ethical problems
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• And added—The scholarship of participation: welcoming those seeking or working 
in other career paths to learn with us and to bring different expertise and viewpoints 
into the educational experience.
These principles assume that academic programs operate in dynamic, aggressive 
settings. COVID-19 has both underlined the relevance of scholarship and revealed 
the shortcomings in academic programming that affect the overall performance of 
public servants. 
The failures of public policies and public management practices are on display daily—
as is the need for public servants who have skills that are applicable in a wide variety of 
circumstances, that are foundational in nearly all public settings, and that position them to 
achieve success. These skillsets enable them to be:
• Force-Multipliers: People who have the ability to influence without authority; possess 
adaptive capacity that responds effectively to innovations in techniques, platforms, and 
perspective; have mastered the levers that affect policymakers’ receptivity to analysis; 
and have learned how to account for the motivations, challenges, and positions of 
others.
• Coalitions Builders: People who know how to build and sustain collaborations, 
even when participants do not agree with each other and are reluctant to join; foster 
agreement on goals and benchmarks; facilitate deliberations; understand and 
overcome differences; and understand how people seek and use analyses and data.
• Strategists for Solving Policy Issues/Problems: People who use facilitation and 
convening skills; build meaningful agendas; and have mastered the art of the long view.
Further, they are skilled at:
• Partnership Engagement: The ability to secure multi-sector partners, bridge systems, 
and solve issues across sectors; learn how to find and recruit allies; and achieve 
community involvement to inform practice and policy. 
• Measuring Impact: Knowing what data and information can be used to establish 
a foundation for non/bipartisan discussion and how to use tools to communicate 
it clearly and simply; understanding both the strengths and the limitations of 
computational analyses, dashboards, road maps, and project/strategic plans.
• Managing Projects and People: Knowing how to procure resources; lead 
multi-generational workforces; and establish welcoming and accountable 
work environments.
• Communicating: Knowing how to lead deliberations among people with a diversity 
of viewpoints; separate truth from opinion; distinguish between hearsay and curated, 
respected sources; communicate the essence of their ideas; and convince others of the 
value of their work.
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Whom We Teach
The pandemic has moved the role of public policies and the consequences of public 
mismanagement and social injustice to the center of public consciousness. The country is 
keenly aware of how policy affects peoples’ lives and how public institutions protect or fail 
to protect citizens’ rights and security. This creates an opportunity for schools of public 
policy to expand our offerings beyond traditional master’s programs and the occasional 
executive education and certificate program. Schools should open up access to their 
faculties, design new learning models, and collaborate with other public entities to teach 
the basics of public policy and its governing processes and tools to a much wider set of 
students and citizens.
The intended outcome of these expansions would be to better utilize the expertise 
resident in policy schools to advance understanding and engagement in the arena of 
public action. To achieve this, public affairs schools need to consider the following actions:
• Open program development to new partners, including public, nonprofit, and 
business sectors.
• Open curriculum construction to new partners, including faculty from other disciplines 
and expert practitioners from public, nonprofit, and business sectors, especially in the 
development of experiential learning opportunities.
• Open programs to new participants, including nontraditional students, lifelong 
learners, and explorers, and consider mixing these new participants with traditional 
master’s students.
• Open programs to new ways of instilling experiential learning, including 
apprenticeships, breaks in study, and intermittent internships.
As a top public affairs institution, the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The University of 
Texas at Austin has faced challenges before. Born in an era of social unrest and civil strife, 
we have never shied away from challenges, nor have we accepted the status quo when 
change is warranted. The pandemic and the civil disruptions that have followed it are a call 
for us to recommit to our core mission of informing civic discourse and developing public 
leaders. 
The time to do this is now.
Angela M. Evans, a National Academy of Public Administration Fellow, became dean of the 
LBJ School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin in 2016. She is the former 
deputy director of the Congressional Research Service of the US Congress. 
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Community Resilience: 
Doing Better at Figuring 
Out Who Does What
DONALD F. KETTL
 In looking back over America’s response to COVID-19 thus far, it’s impossible to 
sidestep one awful, troubling fact: at a time of clear and present danger, we had the wrong 
strategies of governance for the crisis at hand. 
The core of the problem lies in our system of federalism. Too many decisions drifted to 
the wrong places, to dangerous effect. There could be no greater irony than millions of 
Americans turning on Disney+ over the Fourth of July weekend to watch Hamilton, a 
celebration of the nation’s founding, while the system that Hamilton helped create was 
collapsing under COVID’s weight.
At 46.48 deaths per 100,000 population, the fatality rate in the US is the fourth-highest 
in the world, trailing only the United Kingdom, Peru, and Chile, according to the Johns 
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Hopkins Coronavirus Research Center.3  The virus has cut a fearful swath, but there’s 
powerful evidence that it might have been contained had the government not failed to do 
what had to be done. 
Americans have long celebrated their system of federalism, which spreads power across 
its federal, state, and local governments. The Trump administration found it convenient to 
pass key decisions along to governors and, indeed, it would have been unwieldy to try to 
run everything from Washington. Some on the left have been grateful that the Trump team 
allowed governors to step up and lead the response. 
The debate about which levels of government are responsible for which policies has 
been going on for a long time. James Madison wrote about it in Federalist 51 in 1788, and 
theorists have been at it ever since.4 But, at its core, the sad fact is this: America’s brand 
of federalism crippled the nation’s response to the virus. Compared to the world’s other 
major federal systems, the US has done dramatically worse by almost every metric. Check 
out this chart (Figure 1). Not only is the fatality rate in the US higher than in any other 
federal system, but it’s twice as high as in Canada and Switzerland, and four times higher 
than in Germany. 
Figure 1: COVID-19 Fatality Rate per 100,000 Population
Source: Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Research Center
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It’s going to take some time to sort out which strategies have proven most effective in 
those other countries because the conditions are so different in each. It’s clear that in 
a country as vast in geography and population as the US, devolving some important 
operational decisions to the level of governors and mayors was both inevitable and wise. 
But it’s also very clear that the nation’s response was crippled from the start by the federal 
government’s failure to take a stronger role.  
Here are five areas where federal leadership would have made a big difference:
Measuring
• Defining the problem. Federal leaders were in a unique position to define the problem 
authoritatively for the nation, which analysts have pointed out is a hallmark of effective 
leadership.5 Instead, they failed to acknowledge the utter seriousness of COVID-19, 
downplaying it for weeks as not much more than a seasonal flu. Then, they couldn’t 
decide what kind of problem it was: an assault on public health or a challenge to the 
economy? Actually, it’s both, so they also failed to decide which to prioritize. 
• Blocking the spread. Instead of quashing the dispute about COVID-19’s seriousness 
and putting forth a plan of action, the federal government failed to send clear signals 
about what should be done about it. In retrospect, its advice in the early days to not 
wear masks turned out to be bad, although it was based on the best science at the 
time—and on the recognition that masks were in very short supply. But even as it 
became clear that masks were an effective first line of defense, the mixed messages 
continued, feeding a deep polarization on that and most other COVID-19 issues. This 
encouraged non-mask-wearing customers to have meltdowns in mega-stores and even 
led to armed protests in state houses. Federal leaders missed their best chance to slow 
the virus by failing to provide clear messages about what would work best to stop it.
• Tracking the problem. The American response was further crippled by the failure 
to create a single language with which everyone could speak about COVID. Different 
states collected and reported different data sets, and some states even reported the 
The core of the problem lies in
our system of federalism. Too many 
decisions drifted to the wrong
places, to dangerous effect.
“
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same data differently over time.6 Kansas began reporting its count only on Mondays, 
Wednesdays, and Fridays; while in Texas, long lags between hospitalizations and 
hospitalization reports made it difficult to gauge what was happening. In Florida, there 
was a major spat about the state’s dashboard.7 Dashboards run by Johns Hopkins 
and the University of Washington became the go-to sources for information because 
government reporting was so inconsistent.8 Major newspapers became so frustrated 
that they created their own data systems.9 If the federal government had created and 
maintained a vocabulary that everyone could understand and use, our conversation 
might have been a lot less contentious.  
Allocating
• Managing scarce resources. As the virus ramped up, state officials scrambled to 
track down vital supplies, from ventilators to personal protective equipment. Both 
Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker and California Governor Gavin Newsom complained 
that bidding wars among the states created a “wild west” situation that advantaged 
manufacturers and their distributors and hurt citizens.10 Kentucky Governor Andy 
Beshear said he thought he had a deal for PPE only to find that “FEMA came out 
and bought it all out from under us.”11 It’s one thing for the governments of American 
federalism to compete for the best policy innovations, but it makes no sense for 
them to battle against each other for medical supplies. Federal leaders should have 
bargained for the best prices for the equipment and sent it where it was needed the 
most. 
Resilient communities need to
build on a robust federal system, 
as there are some things that only the 
federal government can do. That’s a 
critical lesson to learn from COVID-19.
Leveling
• Preventing and redressing inequities. The dark underbelly of COVID-19 is that it 
has hit communities of color most fiercely.12 After adjusting for age differences, the 
mortality rate for Black Americans is 2.1 times more than for White Americans.13 
“
”
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The virus has struck especially hard in communities that have less access to health 
care and whose members perform frontline work. Federal leaders could have been 
in a strong position to gauge this problem and devise strategies to attack it. Instead 
they punted, allowing COVID-19 to become a scourge that hit hardest at the most 
defenseless. 
As I noted in a blog post, “big national crises have local roots; all problems with local roots 
require effective local response; effective local responses demand an interconnected 
strategy; and an interconnected strategy depends on resilient communities.”14 But resilient 
communities need to build on a robust federal system, as there are some things that only 
the federal government can do. That’s a critical lesson to learn from COVID-19—and one 
that’s been very painfully taught.
Donald F. Kettl is the Sid Richardson Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The 
University of Texas at Austin and author of  The Divided States of America (Princeton 
University Press, 2020). An earlier version of this piece appeared in a blog for the IBM 
Center for the Business of Government. 




 The future is unknowable, which is why we study the past. The long record of 
humanity is the best laboratory we have for understanding how people are likely to act in a 
range of different, often unanticipated, circumstances. Patterns of behavior, not genetics, 
define markets, organizations, and ultimately societies.
No matter how rich and powerful, leaders cannot control the currents of change or the 
surrounding circumstances. No matter how smart and hardworking they might be, they 
can never master every necessary task or understand every crucial issue for the survival 
of the ship of state. They must make choices—often small, but ultimately significant—with 
limited information and under conditions of profound uncertainty. The smartest leaders 
recognize how little they really know and make up for it by leveraging a broad knowledge of 
history to navigate what are always rough seas.
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Few people associate humility with Henry Kissinger, the larger-than-life figure who did so 
much to reshape American foreign policy in the 1970s. But when writing on the subject of 
historical dynamics and the limitations of leaders, he aptly summoned the wisdom of Otto 
von Bismarck: “The statesman can never create anything himself; he can only wait and 
listen until he hears the footsteps of God through the force of events, then lunge forward 
and seize the hem of His coat—that is all.”
To seize the moment is to see opportunities where others do not. Kissinger succeeded 
because he recognized openings for new partnerships, even with former adversaries like 
China. He could see through the partisanship and distractions of his time because he did 
not focus only on the present, but also looked back to assess how societies had developed 
over a long period of time—and how they might change in the future. China needed 
assistance against a continuous Russian border threat, despite their shared communist 
dogmas. The US needed allies in Asia, especially after its lengthy and painful war in 
Vietnam. 
Kissinger drew on a history of shared Chinese-American trade and security interests 
dating back to the nineteenth century to envision how leaders in Beijing and Washington 
could work productively together in the future. They had to look deeper than the public 
recriminations of their current moment and imagine something different, based on past 
experiences. Kissinger found partners in Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, who famously spoke 
of a “historic opportunity” for collaboration, even as they condemned American policies 
elsewhere.
Kissinger, Mao, and Zhou recognized that while the controversies of the present attract 
most of our attention (which is even more the case today, with our 24-hour news cycles 
and pervasive social media), history, even forgotten history, can have a greater bearing 
on the future course of behavior. Patterns forged over a long time are likely to be more 
enduring than the passions of the moment. Enlightened leaders understand this and take 
action to awaken dormant historical possibilities.
 
Abraham Lincoln did this better than anyone. Struggling to win a civil war, justify the 
abolition of slavery (which was protected by the US Constitution), and reunite the country, 
he dug deep into the past. He went back to the American Revolution and the true founding 
document for what would become the United States: the Declaration of Independence. 
Speaking at Gettysburg on November 19, 1863, he began by returning to 1776—“four score 
and seven years ago”—when “our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, 
conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.” 
Lincoln reframed the war not as North versus South, but as “unfinished work,” completing 
the founders’ vision that “this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that 
government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.”
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One hundred years after Lincoln, the leaders of the American Civil Rights Movement used 
history in the same way—to reconnect with a deeper past and articulate an alternative 
to the hatred and violence around them. The peaceful sit-ins and marches organized 
throughout the South by local activists like Fannie Lou Hamer and Diane Nash reenacted 
a long history of efforts by mistreated citizens who appealed to the rule of law for fairness 
and justice. The most famous speech of the movement, delivered by Martin Luther King, Jr. 
at the Lincoln Memorial on August 28, 1963, struck an enduring chord in its return to the 
historic promise of the country’s founding: 
When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution 
and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which 
every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men, yes, Black men 
as well as white men, would be guaranteed the “unalienable rights” of “life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness.” 
King contended that “America has defaulted on this promissory note.” But his famous 
dream—the dream that he stamped on the Civil Rights Movement—was a return to the 
neglected historical trajectory of inclusion, justice, and opportunity for all Americans. 
King called upon his listeners to strive for a future built not on the present hatred of Jim 
Crow, but rather on a deeper strain of American togetherness and hope. He closed with 
the powerful words of an early nineteenth-century hymn to the nation, often sung by 
abolitionists:
My country, ‘tis of thee,
Sweet land of liberty,
Of thee I sing;
Land where my fathers died,
Land of the pilgrims’ pride,
From every mountainside
Let freedom ring!
Of course, Lincoln and King did not convince all of their critics. They were both murdered 
because their words provoked the violent defenders of the very hatred they strove 
to overcome. They could not remake the world themselves; single leaders never can. 
But Lincoln and King succeeded in pushing enduring change because they mobilized 
countless citizens to see beyond their present circumstances and imagine a different 
future, based on past experiences and expectations. By looking backward, they redefined 
the terms of debate, opening up a new potential for future change.  
The past does not, however, make any single future inevitable. Historical thinking allows 
leaders to see alternatives to the present in the past, but each of those alternatives 
offers many different possible futures. For that reason, successful leaders do not make 
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Historical thinking should move leaders from prediction to anticipation—the active 
preparation for any number of possible futures. Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policies 
illustrate this well. Entering the presidency during the worst days of the Great Depression, 
when unemployment was higher than 25 percent and banks across the country were 
failing, Roosevelt looked deep into the past—including many earlier reforms to help the 
poor and vulnerable—to craft a diverse range of programs that stimulated the economy. 
In contrast to Herbert Hoover’s economic orthodoxy, Roosevelt knew he had to widen the 
range of policy options beyond contemporary expectations.
 
He promised recovery, but he never predicted what it would look like. Roosevelt knew 
that each New Deal program—the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Works Progress 
Administration, and numerous others—would have unpredictable results. Instead of 
locking himself into one view of the future, he anticipated many possible futures and 
resolved to adjust as new information became available. The New Deal was an iterative 
experiment, in which leaders implemented ideas from the past, observed the results, 
and made new decisions based on what occurred. The goal was national recovery, but 
the expectation was that the nature of the recovery would evolve over time. Roosevelt 
anticipated mixed and unforeseen developments, and he prepared to adjust. He 
encouraged a deep look into the past and an open vision of what that past could mean for 
an ever-changing future. 
We live in a time similar to Roosevelt’s. COVID-19 has caused a global health and economic 
emergency. Democratic institutions have come under attack from demagogues and 
their supporters, who seek to exploit the suffering of citizens. And long-standing threats, 
especially climate change, are now adversely affecting vulnerable communities on 
every continent.
Historical thinking allows
leaders to see alternatives to
the present in the past, but each of 




predictions. If we believe we know the future, then we lock ourselves into a very narrow 
understanding of the present and the past; we see only the evidence that confirms our 
beliefs. 
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Historical perspective allows leaders
to see many different patterns of
change in the past, which they can
try to leverage for a better future.
Although we do not know what the future will bring, we do know that current conditions 
cannot endure. Leaders are poorly served by reactive efforts to reduce risks and 
limit change. Instead, they must accept and embrace the fact that this is a time of 
transformation. Historical perspective allows leaders to see many different patterns of 
change in the past, which they can try to leverage for a better future. Leaders must avoid 
narrow predictions, anticipate many possibilities, and prepare to adjust as they emerge. 
Openness and flexibility are necessary in looking backward and forward at the same time, 
escaping the paralysis of the present.  
  
Resilient leaders ask the right historical questions: What are the deeper, longer patterns of 
behavior that will shape our future? Which paths of action from the past look promising for 
the future? How can I prepare to observe and adjust to developments I cannot predict? 
Jeremi Suri holds the Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs 
at The University of Texas at Austin. He is a professor in the University’s Department of 
History and The LBJ School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin.
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Understanding 
Distributional Impacts 
Is Key to Community 
Reslience
D. CALE REEVES, VIVEK 
SHASTRY, VARUN RAI
 In the wake of large-scale shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic, community well-
being requires policy responses that put equity and opportunity across all sections of 
the community at their center. A common policy response in the first few months of the 
pandemic was some form of local lockdown. For example, in March 2020, the mayor of 
Austin declared a local disaster and issued the “Stay Home, Work Safe” (SHWS) order, 
“requiring all individuals in the City to stay home or in their place of residence except 
to perform certain essential activities, or to perform work in or obtain service from an 
Essential Business, Essential Government Service, or in Critical Infrastructure.”15 While 
orders like these clearly reduced the local impact of COVID-19, shutting down nonessential 
business and government functions had a wide range of secondary impacts, which 
were not all positive. It is now clear that some already-vulnerable populations bore a 
disproportionate share of the negative health, economic, and social outcomes.
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Not all communities—nor the individuals who comprise them—have equal access to 
the resources that enable resiliency. Many people quickly adapted to the new behaviors 
that the lockdown required, for example, picking up their groceries through “curbside” 
delivery programs. Those who could shift to working from home did so in compliance 
with the SHWS order, continuing to earn their incomes in isolation, while reducing their 
risk of infection. But many employed in the service industry were unable to work at all, 
as bars and restaurants saw substantially reduced business or in many cases shuttered 
entirely. Many employees in roles declared essential were able to retain their income 
streams but at the expense of increased exposure to COVID-19. The inequitable impacts 
illustrated here are problematic in and of themselves, but they are exacerbated when they 
aggravate underlying inequities—such as when service industry or essential employees 
are disproportionately composed of lower-income earners or marginalized groups. Unless 
holistically designed, even necessary and effective policy actions can cause irreparable 
long-term damage to certain populations. 
Effectiveness and equity together must form the core criteria by which policy outcomes 
are evaluated—the long-term resilience of the community as a whole demands it. But with 
little precedent to identify what might constitute a holistically good response in the face of 
high levels of uncertainty, a wide variety of policy designs are inevitable. Shelter-in-place—
similar to the SHWS order in Austin—started as early as March 17th in some California 
counties, and two weeks later in Texas and Florida. The duration of the shelter-in-place 
order was only a month in Texas and Florida and two months or longer in Washington and 
Michigan. Additionally, varying definitions of essential services target shelter-in-place 
orders to different groups of workers. Each of these policy design elements—timing, 
duration, and targeting—evokes a different pattern of behavior among individuals in the 
jurisdiction. At a systems level, the effectiveness of the response depends on the degree 
to which individuals do or do not comply with it—a decision stemming from individual risk 
perceptions, risk tolerances, and social influences. 
Effectiveness and equity
together must form the core
criteria by which policy outcomes are 
evaluated—the long-term resilience of the 
community as a whole demands it.
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For policymakers to balance effectiveness and equity, they need access to tools that allow 
them to assess the system-level dynamics of both the pandemic and of their own (policy) 
responses, so they can resolve potential problems of unequal impacts. Top-down “mass-
action” type models—i.e., those that focus directly on population-scale dynamics, such as 
progression of the pandemic at the county or city level while only coarsely resolving socio-
demographic aspects—are well-understood tools for describing entire systems and have 
played a central role in guiding policymakers through the uncertainties of this pandemic. 
But top-down modeling often lacks the individual- and community-level insights that can 
drive nuanced, equity-based decision making. 
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a bottom-up approach that focuses on the investigation 
of individual-level outcomes and then links those micro-level responses and impacts 
into a system-wide macro-level estimate of efficacy. By focusing on individuals or 
households, ABM also incorporates aspects of individual-level decision making—such as 
the decision to comply with a shelter-in-place order—that most mass-action models only 
resolve at aggregate levels. The ABM approach permits a nuanced understanding of the 
distributional impacts of policy choices, an understanding that is critical for enacting just 
and equitable policies that help build and preserve the resilience of communities.
To understand the full spectrum of interactions among policy design elements and 
behavioral responses, we introduced the COVID-19 Policy Evaluation (CoPE) tool, 
developed recently at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin. 
CoPE is a flexible, modular, empirically and epidemiologically grounded agent-based 
model of the spread of COVID-19 that compares, ex ante, the impacts of different policy 
design elements on the effectiveness and distributional equity of policy outcomes. Tools 
such as CoPE, which use equity as a central criterion for policy evaluation, can help 
policymakers choose the responses that allow communities to better absorb and recoil 
from large-scale shocks in the short term, while safeguarding their resilience in the long 
term.   
We used the CoPE tool to simulate a range of policy and behavioral response scenarios for 
Travis County, Texas. (CoPE enables similar studies for nearly all other counties across the 
US.) In our baseline scenario, the shelter-in-place policy goes into effect twenty-eight days 
after the first exposures occur and is partially lifted forty-five days later. Occupations not 
designated as essential under the guidelines from the CDC and the Texas Governor’s office 
cease having “on-the-job” interactions, while essential employees continue to interact 
both with their coworkers and with those receiving their services. CoPE also models 
social interactions outside the workplace (this is important since mobility reports suggest 
that only about 75 percent of Travis County residents reduced their social activities in 
compliance with the shelter-in-place order).
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Figure 1:  An early shelter-in-place order substantially reduces hospitalizations compared to the baseline. The effect 
is most noticeable in peak hospitalizations. Late SIP orders increase both cumulative (left vertical axis) and peak (right 
vertical axis) hospitalizations over the baseline. Note: To highlight the tradeoff in efficacy and equity, the model that 
generates these results has a higher rate of infection than is empirically observed typically.  
From this baseline, we investigate several hypothetical scenarios shown in Figure 1, 
including what would have happened had shelter-in-place been enacted one week earlier 
or later than it was. The CoPE tool shows, among other outcomes, the important impact of 
shelter-in-place timing on cumulative hospitalizations and peak hospitalizations. For the 
illustrative scenarios shown in Figure 1, we estimate that a shelter-in-place policy enacted 
one week earlier than the baseline results in about 40 percent lower total hospitalizations 
and 30 percent lower peak hospitalizations compared to the baseline. On the other hand, 
a shelter-in-place policy enacted one week later than the baseline results in about 50 
percent higher total hospitalizations and over 200 percent higher peak hospitalizations 
compared to the baseline. These results from the CoPE tool are generally consistent with 
the consensus from several other modeling approaches, including top-down mass-action 
type models. From both top-down and bottom-up modeling approaches, it is clear that 
when faced with a shock event such as the COVID-19 pandemic, policy responsiveness is 
paramount. But that is only half of the story.
Because it uses a bottom-up approach, the CoPE tool can also explore the distributional 
impacts of policy choices. For the same illustrative scenarios described above, Figure 2 
shows how a difference in policy design can impact income groups differently. A rapid 
policy response—enacting shelter-in-place only twenty-one days after initial exposures 
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(i.e., one week earlier than the baseline scenario)—yields fewer hospitalizations (Figure 1), 
but the hospitalizations that do occur disproportionately burden the lowest income group 
(left panel vs. middle panel, Figure 2). In this case, the efficacy gain of an early shelter-in-
place order is borne in part on the shoulders of those with the least access to resources 
that enable resilience.
Figure 2: Distributional equity of shelter-in-place (the shaded time period) impacts on hospitalization by income 
groups show that the lowest income groups are hardest hit in both extremes. Dotted lines show the baseline 
proportion of the population comprising each group, (e.g., middle-income earners make up nearly 50 percent of the 
population). Solid lines show the proportion of daily new hospitalizations from each income group. When the solid line is 
above the dotted line—as it often is for the lowest income group—that group is experiencing disproportionately higher 
hospitalization rates. Note: To highlight the tradeoff in efficacy and equity, the model that generates these results has a 
higher rate of infection than is empirically observed typically.
Policy that is designed and
implemented without consideration 
of distributional impacts is no longer 
excusable—our communities demand 
and deserve better.
The discussion above suggests two key takeaways relevant to community resilience. 
First, a critical aspect of resilience is to manage the scale and scope of shock experienced 
by communities. In the case of COVID-19, rapidly enacted policies helped prevent the 
situation from spiraling out of control in many places, thereby limiting the overall burden 
of COVID-19. This shows the importance of maintaining vigilant awareness of the threat 
“
”
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horizon and of having contingency plans that can be implemented rapidly. Second, 
the distributional impacts of policy decisions can substantially disadvantage already 
underserved communities—for example, the lowest income groups, as illustrated above. 
When they are disproportionately impacted by events like hospitalization—which can incur 
unexpected costs and decreased income, alongside significant health impacts—individual 
and community survival are put at risk in both the short and long term. Effective policy is 
still a central value; but when a policy is expected to be effective and to disproportionately 
burden the vulnerable, complementary programs must be implemented specifically to 
support those vulnerable communities and minimize adverse impacts.
A socially just policy response must consider both effectiveness and equity. Policymakers 
need more tools like CoPE to enable them to make decisions and design policy with 
distributional effects at the fore of the discussion. Policy that is designed and implemented 
without consideration of distributional impacts is no longer excusable—our communities, 
particularly those that are already marginalized and vulnerable, demand and deserve 
better.
D. Cale Reeves is a postdoctoral research fellow, Vivek Shastry is a PhD student, and Varun 
Rai is a professor and associate dean for research at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at 
The University of Texas at Austin. Dr. Rai is also director of the UT Austin Energy Institute.
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Public
Finance
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The Case for Revenue 
Sharing: Fiscal 
Equalization and the 
COVID-19 Recession
JAMES K. GALBRAITH, MICHAEL 
LIND, MARTIN J. LUBY
 The COVID-19 pandemic is pushing state and local governments across America 
into a state of crisis as revenues collapse and deep, damaging, and counterproductive cuts 
in essential public services, including medical care, are being contemplated. According to 
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, state budget deficits may be nearly $110 billion 
in FY 2020 and more than $290 billion in FY 2021.16 These projected deficits are just now 
showing up as dramatic drops in state tax revenue. In Texas, general fund tax revenue in 
the biennium ending August 31, 2021, is estimated to drop by 8 percent ($4.4 billion) in FY 
2020, and 15 percent ($8.8 billion) in FY 2021.17
The ability of most state and local governments to cover such shortfalls by borrowing, 
even in a recession, is strictly limited by their constitutions or laws, which require balanced 
budgets for operating expenses and generally restrict deficits and debt to capital projects. 
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The federal government faces no such constraints, but emergency transfers from the 
federal government to states and localities, when they occur at all, take the form of bailout 
packages which are often too little, too late, too narrowly targeted, and impeded by 
sectional and partisan rivalries.  
The CARES Act, enacted on March 27, 2020, established the Coronavirus Relief Fund, 
which provided $150 billion in federal payments to state governments (80 percent) and 
large local governments (20 percent), along with a Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) that 
can provide up to $500 billion in direct loans to state and local governments. But to date, 
the MLF has been utilized only by one state (Illinois) and one government authority (the 
NYC Metropolitan Transportation Authority) since the interest rate is set at a premium 
over market rates and thus is only attractive to borrowers who can’t access the credit 
markets on reasonable terms. Moreover, the MLF is a short-term lending program to help 
state and local governments manage their cash flow needs. It does not provide resources 
to offset sustained revenue declines or increased spending caused by the pandemic and 
cannot be used for ordinary operating expenses, even Medicaid payments, which increase 
significantly during recessions and epidemics.
In addition, states and localities have been unsure which restrictions on the use of CARES 
Act funding will ultimately apply; as a result, much of the CARES Act funding has gone 
unspent four months after passage of the law.18  In consequence, states and cities facing 
severe drops in their revenues may have to lay off teachers, police, and first responders or 
defer spending on capital projects, even if they receive more federal funds for pandemic-
related health care. In July 2020, almost 100 mayors of cities in Texas asked Congress for 
more flexible funding to help address the shortfalls caused by the pandemic. 19
More flexibility would provide two critical advantages. First, it would permit states and 
localities to maintain essential public services, including education, health care, public 
safety, and core amenities, as well as critical infrastructure and environmental quality. 
Second, the funds would support local economic activity, already severely compromised 
by cutbacks in consumer and investment spending during the pandemic. During slumps, 
the feedback from lower sales and sales tax receipts to lower public spending and lower 
personal incomes worsens economic conditions, compounding the problems facing state 
and local governments and those who rely on them for essential services. The question, 
therefore, is how best to address this problem? We argue for fiscal equalization in the form 
of federal revenue sharing.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines fiscal 
equalization as “a transfer of fiscal resources across jurisdictions with the aim of offsetting 
differences in revenue raising capacity or public service cost. Its principal objective is 
to allow sub-central governments to provide their citizens with similar sets of public 
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The US is the only major democracy 
that does not have a system of fiscal 
equalization at the national level.
services at a similar tax burden.”20 In Canada, fiscal equalization dates back to 1957 and 
was enshrined in the Canadian Constitution in 1982: “Parliament and the Government of 
Canada are committed to the principle of making equalization payments to ensure that 
provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels 
of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.”21
The US is the only major democracy that does not have a system of fiscal equalization at 
the national level, although many state governments address local property tax disparities 
with equalization policies. This has not always been the case. Between 1972 and 1986, 
the US had its own fiscal equalization policy in the form of the General Revenue Sharing 
(GRS) program, sending federal funds to state and local governments, which enjoyed wide 
discretion in their use.  
First proposed by the Democratic economist Walter Heller, chair of the Council of 
Economic Advisers under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the GRS program was pushed 
through Congress by Republican President Richard Nixon. It enjoyed the support of Hubert 
Humphrey, Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, Nelson Rockefeller, Gerald Ford, and Thomas 
P. “Tip” O’Neill, Jr. Administrative costs of revenue sharing were low, only one-tenth of 
one percent. In the state of New York, “revenue sharing paid for teachers in Manhattan 
and streetlights in Buffalo, provided snowplows for Adirondack villages, and built the 
community hall and ice rink in New Hartford.” 22 
Support for revenue sharing was broad but shallow, and the opposition of an odd coalition 
of anti-government conservatives and liberals who preferred narrowly targeted federal 
programs was intense. Ultimately, after fourteen years of operation, revenue sharing was 
abolished in the interest of deficit reduction by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Federal revenue sharing should be revived now as an emergency measure for the duration 
of the economic crisis caused by COVID-19. Revenue sharing would reduce the need for 
one-time, last-minute congressional rescue packages and eliminate the partisan impasses 
that we are presently seeing across the country.
The allocation of $150 billion for state and local governments by the CARES Act provides 
one model for a revenue-sharing formula that could be sustained over several years. 
“
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Funding for local governments with more than 500,000 people was divided among local 
jurisdictions themselves (45 percent) and state governments to be used for the same 
jurisdictions. State governments controlled 100 percent of the funding for populations in 
localities with fewer than 500,000 residents, and each state received a minimum of $1.25 
billion, regardless of population. Funds were also earmarked for US territories and the 
District of Columbia and tribal governments.23
Following the present crisis, Congress might consider making the temporary system 
of federal revenue sharing permanent. Revenue sharing could become a part of the 
economic toolkit known as automatic fiscal stabilizers, available as needed in situations 
that states and localities cannot control. During downturns, the federal government would 
provide funds that state and local government could use to cover gaps in their operating 
expenses, providing a lifeline to teachers, first responders, and other public employees. 
The economic effect of revenue sharing would be counter-cyclical, moderating economic 
declines. Revenue sharing might phase back down as the state and local economy and tax 
base improved.
If a prolonged but temporary program of emergency revenue sharing were converted 
into a permanent system, numerous questions of program design would need to be 
addressed. The federal funds could be drawn from general revenues or from an earmarked 
(hypothecated) tax, like the resource taxes on oil and gas which the Canadian and 
Australian federations distribute among their sub-units as part of their fiscal equalization 
programs. Earmarked taxes for revenue sharing might be sequestered in a trust fund. 
Limiting revenue sharing to funding of public services rather than contributions to social 
insurance, such as the state portions of Medicaid and unemployment insurance (UI) 
funding, might improve the likelihood of the program’s adoption.  
The economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic would have been less severe if 
Congress had not abolished the General Revenue Sharing program. Fiscal equalization in 
the form of a temporary but automatic system of federal revenue sharing, which could be 
converted into a permanent program in the future, can still do much to promote recovery. 
Should it be made permanent, it would significantly reduce the harm caused by future 
economic disasters as well.  
James K. Galbraith holds the Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr. Chair in Government/Business 
Relations at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin and a 
professorship in government at The University of Texas at Austin. Michael Lind and Martin 
J. Luby are, respectively, a professor of practice and an associate professor at the LBJ 
School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin. 
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Minimizing the Financial 





 The Galbraith et al. piece in this toolkit detailed how federal revenue sharing can 
promote the resilience of state and local governments during times of fiscal stress. With 
federal support, painful budget austerity measures—especially in the areas of personnel, 
programmatic, and capital maintenance spending—can be avoided, speeding the eventual 
recovery.  
However, one spending category in state and local government budgets can be reduced 
strategically in times of economic slowdowns without impeding recovery efforts: the 
interest expenditure on the debt that governments sell. Through a strategic program of 
asset-liability management (ALM), state and local governments can reduce their interest 
costs. Like revenue sharing, such a measure would reduce the need for counterproductive 
cuts in spending (though at a smaller scale). More holistically, an ALM program would 
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An ALM program would reduce risks 
while encouraging a more holistic 
approach to the management of
assets and liabilities.
reduce risks while encouraging a more holistic approach to the management of assets and 
liabilities.
ALM was first developed in the 1970s and is used extensively by banks and insurance 
companies. The Society of Actuaries defines it as:
The ongoing process of formulating, implementing, monitoring, and revising 
strategies related to assets and liabilities to achieve an organization’s financial 
objectives, given the organization’s risk tolerances and other constraints. 
ALM is relevant to, and critical for, the sound management of the finances of 
any organization that invests to meet its future cash flow needs and capital 
requirements.24 
A common form of ALM seeks to mitigate risk to an organization from changes in interest 
rates by better matching its assets and liabilities in terms of maturity length and interest 
rate type (floating or fixed). Through ALM, an organization avoids making implicit bets 
on the future direction of interest rates, which improves its cash flow management by 
reducing the spread between asset earnings and liability costs.25
How does ALM apply to state and local governments, and how can they use it to make 
their operating budgets more resilient? Depending on their size, these governments 
have considerable amounts of assets and liabilities subject to interest rate risks that can 
impact their operating budgets. Assets typically include operating and reserve funds 
invested in short-term investments carrying a floating rate that changes regularly (daily, 
weekly, monthly, etc.) based on market conditions. The short-term investment horizon 
is appropriate, as it allows the governments to preserve the principal on their investment 
while maintaining liquidity, since the funds will either definitely be needed within the fiscal 
year (operating funds) or possibly be needed, depending on economic conditions (reserve 
funds).
Among their liabilities are long-term debt obligations used to fund capital projects. Most 
state and local governments sell these bonds with a fixed interest rate that does not 
“
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change over time.  This has the effect of locking in the borrowing cost, providing a benefit 
for future budgetary planning as the interest costs for the entire term of the bonds are 
known when they are sold. Politically speaking, this has the additional benefit of avoiding 
“headline risk,” since fixed-rate debt is often viewed by taxpayers as the most financially 
conservative. However, from an interest rate forecasting perspective, by selling most (if not 
all) of their debt on a long-term fixed interest rate basis, these governments are implicitly 
making a bet that interest rates will rise. Such bets entail risks.
On the asset side, a decline in interest rates would reduce interest earnings and thus 
revenues for the operating budget. On the liabilities side, the interest rate risk is just the 
opposite. An increase in rates would raise the cost of debt and thus reduce budgetary 
resources. State and local governments typically have unmatched asset and liability 
portfolios, with short-term, floating-rate investments on the asset side and fixed-rate, long-
term debt on the liabilities side. A declining interest rate environment would reduce their 
budgetary assets without changing the costs of their liabilities, while a rising interest rate 
environment would produce additional budgetary resources from assets but no change 
in costs from the government’s liabilities. Under an unmatched asset-liability portfolio, 
as is typical for state and local governments, they are better off in a rising interest rate 
environment.
  
But this is problematic in two ways. First, over the last twenty years, the municipal bond 
market has experienced historically low interest rates. That means that governments lost 
their bet. They would have realized significantly lower interest costs if they had sold short-
term, floating-rate debt. Second, and perhaps more importantly for this toolkit, a declining 
short-term interest rate environment is precisely what usually occurs during an economic 
recession.26 So, precisely when state and local governments can least afford it, their 
unmatched asset-liability balance sheets produce a situation where they earn less on their 
assets, putting fiscal stress on their operating budgets, but do not realize a corresponding 
reduction in their interest costs since their debt is not in short-term, floating-rate mode.  
But what about in a rising interest rate environment? Yes, governments with unmatched 
asset and liability portfolios would be better off in that they would earn more on their 
short-term assets while seeing no change in their interest costs. But rising interest rate 
environments are usually associated with economic expansions, with increased tax 
revenues, and other resources. Moreover, the point of ALM is to hedge the two sides of the 
government’s balance sheet and avoid making implicit bets on the direction of interest 
rates. So, under an ALM strategy, when interest rates rise, the increased costs on the debt 
are offset by the increased earnings on the government’s assets. When interest rates 
decline, the reduction in asset earnings is offset by the reduction in interest costs.
The policy implication of ALM in terms of budget resiliency is for state and local 
governments to add some floating-rate debt to their bond portfolios. Given the size of 
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Improving the resiliency of state
and local governments requires more 
strategic financial thinking.
many state and local governments’ short-term assets and the limited amount of unhedged 
floating-rate debt that is currently a part of their debt portfolios, adding a sizeable amount 
of floating-rate debt over time may be appropriate. The use of floating-rate debt in 
reasonable amounts is advocated by many financial experts, including the Government 
Finance Officers Association (GFOA). In fact, the GFOA explicitly identifies the potential 
benefits of floating-rate debt in the ALM context while recommending that governments 
carefully evaluate its risks.27 
 
One of the few state governments that has transparently adopted ALM is the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Massachusetts estimated that its unmatched asset-
liability portfolio cost it over $1 billion dollars between 2004 and 2014.28 While $1 billion in 
savings over ten years will not have the kind of impact that federal revenue sharing does 
with respect to alleviating immediate budgetary stress, it is not an insignificant amount 
of money. To address this economic loss, Massachusetts planned to sell $3.6 billion in 
floating-rate debt for capital projects between 2015 and 2018. Of course, the appropriate 
amount of floating-rate debt for any government will be contingent on the amount of their 
short-term assets that need to be hedged.
      
A few caveats should be noted. First, the use of floating-rate debt requires additional credit 
support facilities from an outside bank, which increases the cost of the debt. This credit 
support can become more costly or scarcer over time, as was the case during the financial 
crisis of 2007–2008. Second, floating-rate debt entails a greater administrative burden on 
the government due to the periodic changes in interest rates that need to be tracked and 
monitored. Thus, any government considering an ALM approach should have a financial 
staff with considerable capacity and financial sophistication. Finally, this policy implication 
does not contemplate a wholesale change in capital finance strategy. More specifically, 
state and local governments should still sell most of their long-term bonds on a fixed-rate 
basis given that their overall debt likely exceeds the amount of their short-term assets, 
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Improving the resiliency of state and local governments requires more strategic financial 
thinking. It also requires an end to the siloing of the people who manage assets and the 
people who oversee liabilities that is all too common.29 ALM provides a good example 
of the strategic advantage that can be gained from a holistic focus on both sides of a 
balance sheet. While there is some hope that the worst may be over in terms of COVID-19’s 
budgetary impacts, there can be no doubt that another economic contraction will occur in 
the future. When it comes, state and local governments that adopted the strategic use of 
ALM will experience some budgetary relief which, in concert with other fiscal support, will 
ensure that the trajectory of their eventual recovery is both steeper and speedier. 
Martin J. Luby is an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The 
University of Texas at Austin.  He is also a registered municipal advisor to state and local 
governments.
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Development
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The New Debt Trap: 




 As of October 30, 2020, the number of global COVID-19 cases was 
approaching 45 million.30 Nearly 8.2 million of them were in the leading advanced 
industrial economy—the United States. Yet, the real and potential consequences of the 
pandemic are likely to be far more extensive, lethal, and long-term in emerging markets 
and developing economics (EMDEs) than in the US. 
By many accounts, the COVID-19 pandemic may set back progress in alleviating global 
poverty by at least twenty years.31 Numerous estimates published by the International 
Monetary Fund, United Nations, and World Bank predict GDP growth to contract anywhere 
from 3.8 to 7.6 percent under the rather hopeful assumption that a COVID vaccine is 
approved and ready for distribution by the end of 2020. In turn, the International Labour 
Organization32 estimates that nearly half of the global workforce—close to 1.5 billion 
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people—may become unemployed due to the “great lockdown.”33 Moreover, nearly 250 
million people34 could face severe food insecurity or famine35 due to disruptions in global 
and domestic food supply chains and loss of income and livelihoods.36 In East Africa alone, 
the World Food Program estimated that the number of acutely food insecure people 
could increase by 73 percent this year.37 Additionally, in the first months of the COVID-19 
pandemic, nearly 30 percent of the world’s children38 were unable to access schooling 
either in person or remotely. The lack of access to education poses the multiple risks of 
lost or delayed learning, increased hunger due to the absence of free school meals, and 
increased risk of forced child labor or early marriage.39   
The COVID-19 pandemic may set back 
progress in alleviating global poverty 
by at least twenty years.
Overall, the threat to global development is severe: this year, between 130 million40 and 
500 million41 people worldwide may fall back into extreme poverty, defined as living on 
less than $1.90 per day.42 As a result, numerous experts43 predict that progress toward the 
2030 Sustainable Development Goals is not only slowing, but may be moving in reverse.44 
Even in the most optimistic scenarios, COVID-19 will likely result in “lost decades of 
development.”45
Here, we focus on one of the most serious systemic threats related to the COVID-19 
pandemic and global development: the looming debt crisis. Nearly half of emerging 
markets and developing economies (EMDEs) were already at high risk of debt crisis before 
COVID-19 was declared a global pandemic by the World Health Organization in March 
2020.46 Since then, the debt situation has only worsened. The IMF projects that average 
2021 debt ratios will rise by 7 to 10 percent of GDP in these countries.47 
While the debt-to-GDP ratio projection is even worse for advanced economies such as the 
US (with projected increases near 20 percent), developing countries do not have the same 
capacity to carry additional debt. Their economic stress is exacerbated by private capital 
flight into “safe haven” economies, limited access to hard currencies that are necessary to 
service debt payments, and slowing economic growth due to declining commodity prices, 
falling remittance inflows, and disruptions in global trade and tourism.48 In March 2020 
alone, foreign investors withdrew more than $83 billion from low-income countries (LICs) 
and lower middle-income countries (LMICs), the largest capital flow ever recorded.49
“
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One example of the looming debt crisis is Uganda.  While the African country has a 
remarkably low number of reported COVID cases, it has suffered tremendously from the 
economic dislocations the pandemic unleashed.  According to a study by Development 
Initiatives, a UK-based think tank, Uganda’s domestic job losses and declining remittances 
have resulted in a significant loss of tax revenues.50 Without export earnings or domestic 
resources, it is difficult for the Ugandan government to address key gaps in its health 
infrastructure, much less enduring problems in poverty, education, and food insecurity. 
Scarce resources have been reallocated toward COVID prevention and treatment, but at 
the cost of reduced spending on malaria prevention and treatment. Public debt in Uganda 
is roughly equal to 41 percent of its GDP, and debt service accounts for nearly 12 percent 
of the government’s annual budget. Uganda’s struggle with COVID-19 demonstrates that 
the pandemic is not simply a public health crisis: it is a threat to the long-term sustainable 
development of most low-income and lower middle-income countries (LICs and LMICs). 
Debt burdens in developing countries limit fiscal resources and the policy space needed to 
address immediate crises in their health care and other social policy systems, as shortfalls 
in inward investments and high debt payments curtail spending on other sectors. This is 
particularly debilitating in the least-developed countries, where health care infrastructure 
was weak prior to the pandemic. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated in 
2014 that 83 countries did not meet their basic threshold for health workers (23 skilled 
professionals per 10,000 people).51 More recently, the WHO calculated that an additional 
nine million nurses and midwives will be needed globally by 2030.52 As a result, these 
countries are not only at higher risk for COVID-related illness and death, they are also 
vulnerable to rapid increases in maternal and infant mortality, the spread of untreated 
diseases like malaria, and an inability to sustain critical vaccination campaigns against 
preventable diseases like polio and tuberculosis. Globally, weak health care systems are 
further threatened as political support wanes for institutions such as the WHO, from which 
President Trump announced his intent to withdraw US membership in July 2020. 
In October 2020, at the fall meetings of the IMF and World Bank, the United Nations’ 
Director of Financing for Sustainable Development warned G-20 finance ministers 
and central bank governors of “protracted fiscal paralysis” and the “worst global crisis 
since WWII” if developing countries do not receive significant debt relief.53 Yet debt relief 
initiatives led by the G-20 so far have fallen short for three key reasons.
First, global aid has fallen in the past several years as official development assistance from 
many major donor countries (including the US) has stagnated or declined in the face of 
domestic economic downturns and the rise of right-wing, ethnonationalist opposition 
to foreign aid.54 Multilateral financial institutions, including the IMF and World Bank, 
had promised to deliver on the estimated $2.5 trillion in financing needed to combat 
COVID-19.55 Yet, as detailed by financial experts, many of these institutions have been slow 
to tap all of their available resources, and disbursement of funds has been painfully slow.56 
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By August 2020, the IMF and multilateral development banks had approved just under 
$175 billion, despite having the legal authority to mobilize and allocate nearly $1 trillion 
from existing resources.57 According to one of these reports, as of September 2020, only 
about $90 billion had been disbursed—less than 12.6 percent of available multilateral 
and bilateral financing.58 This may largely be due to fundamental disagreements 
between major donors over the conditions placed on debt relief, debt suspensions, or 
debt restructuring. For example, while China supported the expansion of IMF Special 
Drawing Rights in April 2020, the US and India blocked this in the G20.59 Overall, while the 
G20 agreed just recently at the IMF and World Bank annual meetings to extend its Debt 
Services Suspension Initiative (DSSI), it has been very slow to come to an agreement on 
the terms of debt relief and to disburse needed funds. Moreover, the IMF and World Bank 
may be hesitant to overextend themselves on debt relief out of fear that they themselves 
might lose their “preferred creditor status” and face a degradation of their own bond credit 
ratings.60 
More critically, other current programs, such as the IMF’s Catastrophe Containment and 
Relief Trust (CRRT), do not adequately address the structural problems of contemporary 
debt restructuring and relief initiatives. Instead, these initiatives repeat historical mistakes 
in placing the burden of adjustment more squarely on borrowers without redressing the 
moral hazards that perpetuate bad lending on the creditor’s side. While the DSSI and 
previous debt relief programs have actively solicited creditor cooperation with innovative 
options such as green debt swaps and buyouts to encourage action on climate change, 
private creditors are rarely forced to realize the risks of their behavior. They are the first to 
be “bailed out” when countries receive debt relief, as Emerging Markets and Developing 
Economies (EMDEs) are eager to maintain critical credit ratings and access international 
credit markets.61 As a result and not surprisingly, private sector cooperation in the DSSI 
and other debt relief programs has been slow and uneven and is only on a voluntary 
basis. This problem grows as the overall percentage of private sector debt grows relative 
to public sector debt offered via multilateral and bilateral sovereign channels. According 
to Gulati 2020, in 2018 alone, EMDEs (excluding China) had a collective external debt of 
$5.9 trillion, of which $2.1 trillion was in private sector debt (e.g., loans from commercial 
banks) and $1.7 billion in public sector debt to private creditors (e.g., bond-holders).62 
This indicates that debt relief or restructuring programs without full buy-in from private 
creditors are unlikely to succeed and may even exacerbate the crisis if debt relief 
stimulates developing countries’ sales of new high-yield sovereign bonds to private 
creditors or worse, triggers a new round of private capital flight.  
Moreover, unlike past debt crises, today’s overwhelming balance of bilateral debt held by 
EMDEs is owed to China, which has largely eschewed multilateral debt relief in favor of 
direct negotiations on bilateral debt agreements.63 In June 2020, China suspended some 
debt repayments for seventy-seven countries, and President Xi pledged to provide $2 
billion over the next two years to aid developing countries in responding to the COVID-19 
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crises within their borders.64 However, many critics point out that China primarily offers 
debt relief in the form cancellation of zero-interest loans65 or loans that were already in 
default.66 These loans represent only a small portion of China’s aid. This inadequate form 
of debt relief leaves most developing countries—especially those participating in the Belt 
and Road Initiative—still on the hook for existing and new non-concessional loans—a form 
of “debt trap” diplomacy that may exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the looming debt 
crisis.67 
In the long term, aid and global 
finance need to be reimagined to 
avoid the inevitable debt traps that we 
have seen repeatedly in history.
Overall, an effective global response to the COVID-19 pandemic will require a well-
coordinated and ambitious effort by multilateral and private sector donors. These 
actors must quickly offer debt relief and suspension packages on conditions that do not 
undermine the ability of borrowing countries to service existing debt. More critically, debt 
programs must enable countries to attract new sources of capital, which will allow them 
to reallocate financial resources to address the immediate public health crisis. In the 
long term, aid and global finance need to be reimagined to avoid the inevitable debt traps 
that we have seen repeatedly in history. Without such steps, the developing world is not 
just going to suffer from the lost decade of development. It is likely to be living with the 
consequence of the COVID crisis for decades to come.
Catherine Weaver is an associate professor and associate dean for students at the LBJ 
School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin. She co-directs Innovations 
for Peace and Development (IPD), a UT Lab devoted to interdisciplinary applied research. 
Rachel Rosenberg is an MGPS Candidate at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The 
University of Texas at Austin and a research affiliate at IPD. She is interested in global 
development, with a specific focus on gender and development assistance.
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Emergency Cash Transfers 
During COVID-19: 
Implementation Lessons 
for the Global South
ANA CANEDO, RAISSA 
FABREGAS, MEGAN MORRIS
 Following the imposition of lockdowns in March 2020, the US federal government 
implemented a one-time $1,200 payment to qualifying adults. The government’s ability 
to provide direct economic assistance during a crisis relied on existing platforms and 
employment paper trails to target and deliver the funds. Lists of recipients could be 
generated from existing IRS databases, eligibility could be targeted to levels of income 
and numbers of dependents, and most recipients received their payment directly through 
their bank accounts.68 Absent this infrastructure, how could other countries deploy rapid 
economic support for those in need?
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Addressing the Economic Impacts of COVID-19 Through Cash Transfers
In developing countries, where the economic impacts of COVID-19 are expected to be even 
more severe, the deployment of cash transfers is subject to additional challenges. These 
countries have fewer resources and lower fiscal capacity than advanced economies and 
a much higher share of self-employed or informal workers (see Figure 1). Informal sector 
workers are more vulnerable to the COVID-19 crisis since they are rarely enrolled in social 
security coverage or health insurance and depend on their daily incomes for subsistence. 
They are also more difficult to reach through traditional social security programs since 
their work is often not visible to the government.69
Figure 1: Total Informal Employment by Region
Source: ILO, 2018 
Policymakers have adopted several strategies to address the crisis, including cash 
transfers, social insurance programs, low-cost credit, job retention schemes, and utility 
and financial waivers.70 As long as people have access to markets, cash transfers may 
be disbursed faster than food vouchers or other in-kind schemes and enable people to 
prioritize their needs while stimulating their local economies. Importantly, cash transfers 
can measurably improve conditions. 71, 72  In rural Kenya, for example, cash benefits have 
been shown to have positive impacts on food security and physical and mental health.73 
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Figure 2: Cash Transfer Use for Sampled Population
Despite the positive role that transfers can play, there are many questions about how 
exactly to implement them. The priority should be to ensure that the most vulnerable 
get the income support they need as quickly as possible. But how should governments 
identify and target the most vulnerable? How should they be reached? Difficult decisions 
must be made, given the uncertainty of the pandemic, fiscal and political constraints, 
Extensive research is underway to examine further the impacts of COVID-19 emergency 
cash initiatives in Pakistan, Jordan, South Africa, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and 
Ecuador.74
Via a research partnership with a Mexican state agency, we are analyzing the impacts of 
an emergency cash transfer program (a one-time $235 payment) specifically designed 
to target informal workers who lost their primary income sources during the COVID-19 
pandemic. The sampled population shows marked signs of distress: 72 percent reported 
food insecurity, and 56 percent had signs of depression. Figure 2 reports the use of these 
transfers among surveyed individuals. The majority reported using them to cover basic 
needs, including food.
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and the flexibility or inflexibility of existing systems. While research is still ongoing, the 
emerging evidence highlights some important considerations for policymakers.  
Adapting Cash Transfers to the COVID-19 Era
Identifying and targeting beneficiaries through existing systems speeds up the 
response. A big challenge for policymakers is to quickly and accurately identify vulnerable 
people. Countries with existing social registries in place can more rapidly respond to 
emergencies. For example, the Dominican Republic used its extensive social registry to 
expand emergency support to 70,000 informal workers.75 Likewise, Brazil’s Cadastro 
Unico, a nation-wide database of vulnerable populations, enabled a quick expansion 
of cash support to at least 11 million people. In other countries, like South Africa and 
Pakistan, eligibility was simplified because applicants could be matched across existing 
government databases via unique ID numbers. Other countries, such as El Salvador, have 
used non-traditional data sources to target beneficiaries, such as households with low 
electricity consumption (250kw/month).76
Informal sector workers are more 
vulnerable to the COVID-19 crisis 
since they are rarely enrolled in social 
security coverage or health insurance 
and depend on their daily incomes
for subsistence.
Self-targeting is an attractive option during an emergency, but better systems 
should be built for the future. Unfortunately, social registries and other administrative 
databases that could identify potential recipients do not exist in many developing 
countries. This makes identifying potential beneficiaries much more difficult. During non-
emergency situations, countries can rely on a series of approaches like proxy-means 
testing, which relies on observing a households’ assets, or community-based targeting, 
which relies on community knowledge to allocate support.77 But in the context of the 
current crisis, these approaches may be inappropriate as they require significant amounts 
of time and resources. Geographic targeting is an inexpensive and quick method but risks 
leaving out people in need who live in richer regions. This might be a particular concern 
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Given these limitations, self-targeting can be an attractive option. The main concern 
with this approach is inclusion errors, meaning the possibility that there will be some 
unintended beneficiaries. To reduce this risk, many programs implement some sort 
of take-up cost that could deter those who don’t need the program from applying. For 
instance, in the Mexican emergency cash transfer program, applicants had to complete 
an online form, attend an interview, sign an affidavit declaring need, and commit to 
volunteer in the future if asked to do so. However, during an emergency, errors of inclusion 
are less important than errors of exclusion. A complicated application form or too much 
bureaucracy might deter those who are less literate or empowered to apply.78
Digital approaches are promising, but many areas and individuals still lack adequate 
coverage. The rapid expansion of mobile phones in developing countries has opened 
new opportunities to reach people at scale and in a timely manner. The value of digital 
approaches has been increasingly clear during the pandemic, in which potential 
recipients of aid are able to be targeted, screened, and enrolled remotely.   Mobile 
banking payments are attractive at a time when both speed and social distancing are key 
priorities. Additionally, digital approaches are preferred by beneficiaries who have mobility 
restrictions or are concerned with safety issues around receiving cash.79, 80  However, 
digitalization is far from universal, and these approaches need to be complemented in 
ways that reduce the potential exclusion of vulnerable populations. Many countries lack 
mobile banking services, and even simple mobile phones are uncommon in some regions. 
Moreover, women might be particularly prone to exclusion, since they are less likely to own 
mobile phones in many countries.81
COVID-19 has shown us the
need to create more dynamic
and responsive safety nets to
prepare for future crises.
Building Resilient Systems: Beyond COVID-19
COVID-19 has shown us the need to create more dynamic and responsive safety nets to 
prepare for future crises. Governments can respond more quickly and effectively during 
emergencies if they prioritize building flexible administration and data management 
systems to scale programs up and down as needed. Some of the current challenges do 
not come as a surprise: even before the pandemic, many called for the adoption of social 
protection systems that are less dependent on formal employment.82
“
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There are several steps that countries can take to prepare for the future. First, expanding 
social registries beyond the poorest would allow them to understand who might be 
vulnerable to income shocks in a crisis and react accordingly. Second, improved 
data management and analysis and advances in machine learning have opened new 
opportunities to use a wide range of databases to target vulnerable populations and 
create early warning systems.83 Developing ongoing ties with researchers, think tanks, 
and other experts could allow governments to utilize these tools and knowledge. Third, a 
government’s ability to react to these situations is clearly dependent on its flexibility to 
rapidly scale services up and down as needed. Flexible systems enable governments to 
coordinate and transfer resources and human capital from different units and promote 
enhanced cooperation across bureaucracies. Finally, this pandemic has underlined 
the positive role that the internet, information and communication technologies, and 
complementary services like digital banking can play. Policymakers need to act to ensure 
even broader access. With more research, more lessons will emerge about how best to 
improve our responses. Understanding what worked and what didn’t during the COVID-19 
crisis will help create more resilient social protection systems in the future.
Ana Canedo is a PhD candidate in public policy, Raissa Fabregas is an assistant professor, 
and Megan Morris is a Masters of Global Policy Studies student at the LBJ School of Public 
Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin. 
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 On college campuses, developing new knowledge and insights are things 
of value in and of themselves. For intelligence officers (and for policy analysts, I would 
argue), value is achieved when facts and insights are persuasively communicated to 
policymakers, who then choose to act upon them. The faltering response to the pandemic 
at every level of decision making (national, state, local, and individual citizens) represents 
an intelligence failure of the first order, even if the facts that were reported to the 
government were generally correct. The consequences of this failure are so grave that it 
underlines how much students (and faculty) at public policy schools can stand to benefit 
from a better understanding of the role of intelligence, and provides important lessons 
that will help them avoid making the same mistakes when they become policymakers 
themselves.   
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Epidemiologists will use their models for years after the pandemic is over to examine how 
the panoply of national and state responses altered outcomes. The dependent variable 
in their analyses will be the numbers of Americans who died. Put another way, they will 
prove that policy matters. By extension, then, analytic support to policy matters. The 
inescapable truth with regard to the pandemic is that while it was inevitable that the virus 
would reach our shores to cause some loss of American lives, it was within our power to 
alter the equation. Had we acted upon the available information and analysis earlier, more 
effectively, with greater discipline, and with more unity, the number would have been a 
fraction of what it is—and eight months into the pandemic, the virus still shows no signs of 
abating. The biggest variable in terms of where we will end up along the spectrum will not 
be the availability of information but how individual decision makers used it.
Was COVID an “Intel Failure?”
Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, 
bureaucratic thing. It includes…the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that 
has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, 
but also the one who knows he’ll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher 
authority out of bed...It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings 
to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion—which is usually too 
late….Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine 
novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.
–Thomas Schelling, in his foreword to Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision by 
Roberta Wohlstetter84
Experienced instructors at the “Farm” (where the CIA trains its officers in clandestine 
operations) sometimes say that their most common answers to students’ questions are 
either “You’re smart, figure it out” or “It depends.” “It depends” sounds like a dodge but 
is often, in fact, the best answer. Cookie-cutter approaches don’t work in complex and 
The faltering response to the pandemic
at every level of decision making 
(national, state, local, and individual 
citizens) represents an intelligence
failure of the first order.
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nonlinear contexts like clandestine human operations or pandemic responses. But, as we 
told our instructors, this makes it important to explain clearly what “it depends” depends 
on and to articulate principles for grappling with the task or situation in question. 
In the last seven months, I have been asked whether the US response to the pandemic 
represents an intelligence failure or a policy failure or both. The answer is clear: 
“It depends.” Specifically, it depends on how one envisions the role of intelligence. The 
traditional, almost universally used “intelligence cycle” model visualizes intelligence as a 
continuous loop of “direction/guidance, collection, analysis, and dissemination.” 
Figure 1: Traditional Intelligence Cycle 
Using this near-universal visualization, the intelligence community, the CDC, and others 
can make a strong case that the failures in response to the pandemic were not with the 
intelligence itself. They can point to their repeated and clear warnings regarding the need 
to prepare for a pandemic originating in Asia, as well as their explicit tactical warnings 
about COVID-19. Using the traditional model of intelligence, their collection and analysis 
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policy and policy execution. This response, while perhaps accurate, doesn’t offer many 
lessons about where the breakdowns actually occurred or practical advice about how to 
avoid similar failures in the future. 
What Intelligence Can and Cannot Do
Every class on intelligence I’ve taught at UT includes this objective in its course 
description: “help students understand what intelligence can and cannot do.” In each of 
these classes, I posed this question early on: “What memories haunt retired intelligence 
officers the most?” In each class (so far), some student will hesitantly ask, “Not being 
right?” or perhaps “Getting it wrong?” 
It would be a mistake to use one model 
to parse blame for our poor response 
to the pandemic, given the complex 
interplay of national, state, local, and 
individual actors who make up our 
complicated political system.
At the end of the course, we return to the question. In every class so far, one or more 
students will confidently answer: “Failing to warn decision makers” or “Failing to inform 
policy.” By now, they understand that one of the few things intelligence officers know with 
certainty is that they cannot know the future. As their response reveals, the students also 
understand that the best intelligence can do is reduce uncertainty for decision makers. 
Despite their self-awareness about their lack of clairvoyance, good intelligence officers are 
confident and optimistic not only that they can reduce uncertainty, but that this reduction 
contributes significantly to national security in the form of better and more timely 
decisions, whether these decisions relate to long-term strategy or crisis management. 
Returning to models of intelligence, then, it turns out that we get different answers and 
more useful insights to assessments of intelligence successes or failures when we use a 
model that 1) is based on performance in support of the policymaking process instead of 
the intelligence processes, and 2) that includes policymakers. In this model, policymakers 
are part of the intelligence enterprise with roles to play that go beyond levying 
requirements. Beyond the inclusion of policymakers, the biggest difference with this model 
is that it bakes in a principle: intelligence can fail because intelligence officers got it wrong, 
but it cannot succeed merely because they got it right. Using this model, in my view, we 
must conclude that in the case of COVID-19, our national warning system failed.
“
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Figure 2: Intelligence Performance Cycle 
This model is also depicted as a cycle that includes collection and analysis, but it 
emphasizes that effective performance by intelligence requires:
• Actively Asking and Anticipating. Policymakers and intelligence officers must 
aggressively seek to ask the right questions, and intelligence officers must also 
anticipate questions not yet asked by policymakers. In a large undergrad class in late 
January or early February of this year, I used an exercise on the COVID virus in Asia to 
illustrate this point. An imaginary policymaker asked the class whether it would come 
to the US and to identify the most important questions to answer. After a half-hour 
exercise, the answers produced were: “Yes, definitely,” “How exactly does it spread?” 
and “How lethal is it?”
• Persuading and Warning vs. Dissemination. The word “dissemination” is much too 
passive to describe the importance and, sometimes, the urgency of getting intelligence 
to those who can act upon it and actively assessing whether they found it convincing. 
This is especially required when the aim is to warn, and it is even more true when the 
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• Hearing? Believing? Acting? This is the part of the performance cycle that differs 
most from the traditional intelligence cycle because these are all expressed as 
questions about the attitudes and behaviors of policymakers. If they are too busy, 
too inert, too distracted, or too uninterested to even make time to read or hear the 
intelligence, no intelligence system can work. If they did read or hear it, to what extent 
did they find it persuasive? Did they engage and ask questions, for example? If they 
rejected it, was it for valid reasons, such as a lack of evidence, or because it was not 
consistent with their world view or it was politically inconvenient? Finally, to the extent 
that they were (even partially) persuaded, did they then take action in response?  
We use this model because the interface between intelligence and policy is where most 
historical intelligence failures dwell. There are many explanatory pathologies to be 
examined in that space. One of the most common, which is relevant to the pandemic 
response (and also to 9/11), is when a warning is heard and is persuasive but the 
policymakers’ response is to ask to be “kept informed” or to “come back as soon as you 
have more information.” This response may be considered defensible at times, given the 
price of taking action, but it is, nevertheless, procrastination and wishful thinking about 
the ability to eliminate uncertainty. It almost invariably results in losing the advantages 
inherent in having even a little more time to prepare.
It would be a mistake to use one model to parse blame for our poor response to the 
pandemic, given the complex interplay of national, state, local, and individual actors who 
make up our complicated political system and the fact that we are still in the midst of the 
crisis. Such a rush to historical judgment would almost certainly result in more needless 
loss of life because it would further politicize the response. There will be time for that 
later. We need to reflect on the differences in the models above now for the same reason: 
because we are still in the pandemic and are making life and death decisions every day. 
Intelligence and expert analysis can only add value in this context if policymakers use it. 
J. Paul Pope is a professor of practice at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The University 
of Texas at Austin. He retired in 2016 after 46 years of service as a soldier and a senior 
officer in the Central Intelligence Agency. 
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The World That COVID 




 COVID-19’s long-term effects on the international system remain unknown, 
in part because the course of the disease remains unknown. Much still depends on factors 
such as potential new waves of infections as the northern hemisphere winter approaches, 
improved treatments, and especially the development of an effective vaccine.85
 
At this point, some nine months into the plague, we do know that COVID-19 is not a 
geopolitical blip of little consequence. It has already inflicted a ghastly human toll and 
caused disastrous social and national dislocations. It is sharpening the key rivalry of 
the twenty-first century—the US-China competition—and highlighting strains that were 
already disordering the world. 
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But it is unlikely to cause a fundamental altering of the global system on par with what 
happened after World War II destroyed two leading great powers, Germany and Japan, 
catalyzed the collapse of the European colonial empires, and propelled the United 
States to international primacy. And the changes that it does cause may not make the 
international landscape dramatically more menacing. There is even a scenario in which 
the pandemic weakens autocracy and populism more than democracy, underscores 
America’s structural power even as it temporarily damages its soft power, catalyzes a 
more formidable balancing coalition against China, and leads to a more realistic form of 
globalization as well as renewed cooperation between the world’s democratic states. 
 
That depends, however, on what choices America makes in a post-COVID world. The 
COVID pandemic reminds us that “American leadership” is not a trite euphemism. It is 
arguably the single most important factor in whether the arc of history bends toward 
something better or something worse. America must soon recover the tradition of 
enlightened global leadership that it presently seems to have abandoned. 
 
The fact that American dominance, the liberal order, and other aspects of the pre-
COVID status quo continued for decades suggests that they possessed a higher degree 
of resilience than is often appreciated. Just as important, a closer look at some of the 
dynamics unleashed or highlighted by the crisis points to several opportunities for the US 
and our allies:
 
The pandemic leads not to de-globalization but to re-globalization 
along geopolitical lines. 
The fundamental drivers of long-term globalization—technology that shrinks distances, 
the quest for economic growth that spurs trade, and the recognition that global problems 
do not recognize borders—have not been undone. If anything, they are underscored. 
For example, the need for growth to reduce the crushing debt burden created by the 
pandemic-generated recession will eventually produce a resurgence in global trade. 
In some ways, the crisis may create opportunities for deeper globalization. As individual 
nations and leaders wrestle with the next phases of the COVID response, particularly 
antiviral therapies, vaccine development, contact tracing, and mass immunity, it will 
become clear that no one nation-state will be able to develop these alone. The resulting 
networks—some evolving organically, and others reinforced by institutional mandates and 
incentives—will create a connective tissue that binds nation-states together rather than 
furthering their distance. 
The crisis may create opportunities
for deeper globalization.“ ”
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The medium-term outlook could well be managed globalization along two discernible lines. 
First, supply chains will likely diversify, with the risk premium justifying the inefficiencies of 
redundancy. In most cases, the costs of entirely on-shoring production back to the US will 
be prohibitive. But savvy firms should be able to generate more resilient production chains 
without complete on-shoring, and those firms will have a competitive edge over others 
chasing the unicorn of autarky. 
 
Second, globalization will increasingly occur within, rather than across, geopolitical 
lines. The quest for diversification and modest US-China decoupling will likely result in a 
diversion of trade and investment flows to other countries, particularly historic allies like 
Europe and Japan and other regions such as South and Southeast Asia, where states have 
their own incentives to minimize their vulnerabilities to Chinese coercion. Geopolitical logic 
will reinforce and accelerate this trend, since deeper trade and economic integration could 
strengthen the “free world” economy for competition with Beijing.
 
The pandemic does not result in dramatic, adverse shifts in the balance 
of power. 
Even optimists would concede that America’s geopolitical position has worsened 
somewhat as a result of the crisis. The fact that China seemed to gain the upper hand in 
its fight against the spread of COVID-19 just as the US and its major allies were slogging 
through the toughest phase of the lockdown reinforced the impression of waning Western 
and especially American power. It also enabled the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
to pursue its aims while Washington and its democratic allies were laid low; witness 
the tightened control over Hong Kong, increased repression in Xinjiang, and renewed 
belligerence toward Taiwan.
 
If the psychological balance of power shifted rapidly, however, the material balance did 
not shift in a decisive or enduring way. The pandemic damaged every major economy. 
Almost every geopolitical unit that has been touted at one time or another as a possible 
emerging disrupter of US primacy—the European Union, Russia, India, or Brazil—suffered 
a grievous economic wound. If anything, the flight of international investors toward the US 
in the middle of the crisis, along with the dollar’s resilience as the global reserve currency, 
underscored the fundamental sources of the nation’s structural strength.  
 
The pandemic has also drawn attention to China’s economic and political fragility. Beijing 
botched its initial response to the spread of the virus and then botched its attempt to 
cover up that fact with crude propaganda and gifts of defective PPE. While the CCP 
welcomed the pandemic’s undermining of global and American domestic confidence in 
the United States, over the medium and long term it is unlikely that even this will redound 
to China’s advantage. 
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While American soft power and diplomatic prestige often attach in the short term to the 
successes and failures of a particular leader, they tend to reset fairly quickly after the next 
electoral cycle. Previous declines in American soft power were followed by sharp bounce-
backs, in some cases caused by nothing more than a change in the White House. If, a year 
from now, the US is seen to be acting more competently at home and abroad, the deeper 
sources of American soft power and prestige may reassert themselves. And if the United 
States leads in developing and distributing a working vaccine—a big “if,” but one that the 
US is well-positioned to achieve—then the soft-power bounce-back could be substantial. 
 
For China, by contrast, the long-term diplomatic trends seem more troubling. The fact 
that dozens of countries called for an international inquiry into the pandemic’s origins, 
that international anger at China rose considerably on multiple continents, and that a 
number of countries that had previously accommodated China swung toward a harder 
line all suggest that Beijing may confront a more formidable balancing coalition in the 
years to come. Admittedly, forging an effective balancing coalition will require more skillful 
US diplomacy than it has exhibited of late. But it is quite possible that this pandemic will 
scathe China more than the United States. 
 
The liberal order holds and is revitalized. 
As poorly as the institutions of the liberal order performed during the initial stages of the 
pandemic, they still command more legitimacy in the rest of the world than any plausible 
alternative. The more likely scenario could be reform and innovative new institutions rather 
than collapse.
 
Lamentations over the weaknesses of international institutions often go in tandem with 
expressions of nostalgia for a past golden era of multilateral cooperation. But such an era 
never existed. International institutions have always faced geopolitical challenges and 
criticism for their failings. Yet they adapted and endured—and that could happen again. 
What may emerge is a shift to a two-tiered order: one involving the world’s democracies, 
with a higher level of cohesion and ambition, and the second a broader order with a 
larger number of countries but a lower level of cohesion and ambition, reserved only for 
transnational issues such as pandemics and climate change.
  
For example, the G-7 could evolve into a D-10 that includes the leading democracies 
committed to developing alternatives to technological dependence on China. The United 
Kingdom has already proposed such a reform. The EU is considering plans to deepen 
fiscal integration by making additional funds available to COVID-stricken economies. US 
military alliances are likely to prove even more relevant in the more competitive world that 
is now emerging. The imperative of decreasing economic dependence on autocracies 
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could lead over time to trade and investment agreements that focus on deepening ties 
between America and like-minded democracies. And if the United States commits to 
fighting harder for influence in obscure but important institutions that China has sought to 
corrupt, the effectiveness of those institutions could be restored.
The pandemic proves deadlier for autocrats and populists than for 
democrats.
Authoritarians and populists have short-term advantages in confronting a pandemic—
for example, in implementing draconian public health measures and exploiting the 
demagoguery that accompanies suffering. But several months into the pandemic, there 
does not seem to be a lasting dictator’s dividend. The nations that displayed the most 
effective responses are liberal democracies, including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, 
Denmark, New Zealand, and Germany. Singapore, a soft-authoritarian city-state, is the 
main example of a non-democracy that marshaled an effective response and is almost the 
exception that proves the rule. 
 
The performance of the world’s foremost authoritarian regimes was somewhere between 
mediocre and catastrophic. China’s delayed response to the COVID-19 outbreak, 
once galvanized, drew on the advantages that authoritarianism offers, including 
mass lockdowns and mass surveillance. Yet that response was necessary because 
the authoritarian system had prevented a more effective earlier response, and the 
pandemic almost certainly caused much higher numbers of infections and deaths than 
its government has admitted. Iran, Russia, Turkmenistan, and North Korea also seem to 
have been hit very hard, with the damage obscured only by their lack of transparency. 
Of course, many democratic nations have also under-performed, especially the US. But 
the point is that neither type of political system has a monopoly on ineptitude in its initial 
response—and that democracies are still well positioned to win the governance challenge 
over the long term. 
From a free press and an independent judiciary to opposition parties, decentralized 
governance, and elections, democracies possess an ecosystem of self-correction that 
provides warnings when policies aren’t working, information channels for suggesting 
new approaches, policy laboratories for experimenting with different responses, and 
accountability channels for citizens to either reward or punish their elected leaders and 
the administrators who serve under them. Authoritarian systems, in contrast, eschew 
these mechanisms, any one of which could threaten the autocrat’s monopoly on power. 
In the near term, admittedly, such crises can provide political cover for leaders to 
consolidate control; they can also create the anger and resentment on which populist 
leaders thrive. But authoritarians cannot indefinitely hide from the convergent pressures 
of disaffected citizens, dysfunctional health systems, eroding control, and economic 
stresses accentuated by the crisis, and their political systems tend to be more brittle 
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than democracies when confronted by such challenges.  Witness the ongoing protests in 
Belarus as the latest example. 
American policy may be the most important factor in determining which way the 
future breaks.  If the United States commits its vast power and prestige to deepening 
cooperation and economic integration with the democracies, promoting a geopolitically 
informed globalization rather than a wholesale retreat from globalization, if it focuses 
on reforming and competing for influence within the institutions of the liberal order that 
underperformed or were corrupted by authoritarian influence and to developing the 
policies—not simply the rhetoric—of responsible competition with China, then the fluidity 
that the crisis has created may well redound to the advantage of America and the “free 
world.” 
 
But if the US chooses a course of narrow economic nationalism, gratuitous provocation 
of its closest allies, retreat from institutions in which it does not get its way, and continued 
downgrading of efforts to promote democracy and human rights, and if the country 
indefinitely flounders in discharging its responsibilities at home and abroad, then the 
future indeed looks grim. 
Bringing about the better scenario will require better American leadership in myriad ways:
 
• Using its power to convene other nations for common goals;
• Setting the agenda for what issues to focus on, and how;
• Providing economic, personnel, and technological resources toward international 
challenges;
• Leading the gathering, analysis, and sharing of information on global problems; 
• Pioneering innovative and creative solutions;
• Deploying leverage to induce or persuade those otherwise reluctant to make 
responsible choices;
• Serving as a moral exemplar;
• Demonstrating competence in policy design and implementation; and,
• Being willing to sacrifice narrow self-interest in favor of the enlightened self-interest 
that comes from pursuing a larger global good.
 
This list is an implicit indictment of all that was lacking in American statecraft as the 
pandemic spread, and a reminder of just how dramatically US performance will have to 
change to tip the balance from a dark future to a brighter one.
William Inboden is an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The 
University of Texas at Austin. He is also the William Powers Jr. Executive Director of the 
Clements Center for National Security.
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Healthy Communities Are 
Resilient Communities, 
Resilient Communities Are 
Healthy Communities
SHERRI R. GREENBERG, 
MICHAEL K. HOLE
 In January 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson declared an “unconditional war on 
poverty in America,” unleashing a flurry of policies and programs to improve Americans’ 
health and prosperity. LBJ well understood how poverty, among other social problems 
such as racism, hunger, and homelessness, makes people sick. Today, over five decades 
later, health experts agree: what happens outside America’s health system also matters 
to Americans’ health. A healthy community is a resilient community, and a resilient 
community is a healthy community.
 
Social and economic factors affect people’s physical and mental health and resiliency. 
Some of these factors include their ability to pay for medicines and healthy food, their 
transportation options, their access to high-quality education and childcare, their 
jobs and financial resources, and their housing and environmental conditions. Hence, 
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under-resourced populations generally are less healthy than more-advantaged ones. 
Strong evidence shows they have higher rates of chronic diseases, such as diabetes, 
hypertension, and heart disease, as well as other disparities in health outcomes, such 
as lower life expectancies. Disparities occur in many groups, including, but not limited to 
people with low incomes, people of color, people that live in the outskirts of urban areas 
and rural communities, people with disabilities, people in jail and prison, and people in 
the LGBTQIA community. We must find ways to bring people to services and services to 
people.
Unemployment, small business closures, and an economic recession amid the COVID-19 
pandemic have been especially hard on under-resourced populations. Central Texas, 
and the entire nation, have seen startling statistics regarding health disparities during 
COVID-19. For instance, Austin Public Health reports that between mid-March and mid-
October of 2020, fully 48 percent of the people hospitalized for COVID-19 in the five-
county Austin metropolitan statistical area (Travis, Williamson, Hays, Bastrop, and Caldwell 
Counties) were Lantinx, and 10 percent were Black. 
Today, over five decades
later, health experts agree:
what happens outside America’s 
health system also matters
to Americans’ health.
But the crisis has yielded some positive changes, too. COVID-19 highlighted and 
exacerbated the long-standing need for remote and mobile services delivery in the Austin 
area, and it accelerated innovations in health care, social services, transportation, and 
other industries. Consider these five local examples:
• Telemedicine and Telephonic Medicine. During COVID-19, Central Health-affiliated 
CommUnityCare clinics in Travis County saw a tremendous increase in telemedicine 
and telephonic medicine: up to 70 percent of its health care appointments transitioned 
from in-person to remote. 
• Mobile COVID-19 Testing. Central Health/CommUnityCare and Austin Public 
Health implemented mobile COVID-19 testing in Travis County, as did many other 
communities nationwide. Under-resourced populations received special consideration. 
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• Online Connection to Community Resources. The City of Austin COVID-19 website 
offers resources for individuals, health care providers, and businesses, ranging from 
a call center for high-risk workers to testing and recovery assistance. Likewise, the 
United Way for Greater Austin assembled robust resources on its ConnectATX website, 
including emergency food, housing, transportation, physical and mental health, 
benefits, childcare, and parenting. 
• Grocery Delivery. Grocery delivery services, once a luxury for people with higher 
incomes, became available to people with lower incomes and helped high-risk 
individuals avoid grocery stores, food pantries, and public transportation, and, 
therefore, infection and hospitalization. For example, Good Apple, an Austin-based 
grocery delivery company, launched from The Impact Factory at UT Austin, leveraged 
partnerships with local farms, food banks and pantries, private transportation 
companies, city government, and philanthropies to deliver 650,000-plus pounds of 
healthy food directly to the doors of more than 21,000 older adults with low incomes 
and others at high-risk from COVID-19. This has saved untold lives and health care 
dollars since mid-March 2020.
• Video Calls for Mental Health. Video conferencing platforms, once a novelty, became 
commonplace and, for some, a tool to combat mental health issues exacerbated 
by shelter-in-place ordinances. For example, Big & Mini, another organization in the 
portfolio of The Impact Factory at UT Austin, is an online platform and smart phone 
application aimed at bridging generations and reducing social isolation and loneliness. 
Big & Mini has matched 600-plus pairs of seniors and teens in fifty states and twenty-
two countries since early April 2020. 
COVID-19 also increased health systems’ focus on population health, accelerating cross-
sector partnerships to slow the spread of disease. Consider these examples from the 
Austin area:
• Rapid Distribution of PPE. Travis County health care providers, nonprofits, faith-
based entities, companies, and community groups partnered to enable drive-through 
distribution of personal protective equipment (PPE), such as masks and hand sanitizer, 
for under-resourced populations, as well as delivery of PPE to small businesses and 
apartment complexes. 
• Repurposing Space. Many under-resourced populations are at high-risk for both 
acquiring and spreading infections. For example, people experiencing homelessness 
often have no place to shelter-in-place after testing positive. The City of Austin provided 
space in motels free of charge so people who needed to could isolate. 
• Data Visualization. Many communities have developed COVID-19 tracking 
dashboards. The Austin Public Health Department collaborated with researchers at 
the University of Texas at Austin to provide data and visualizations on the City of Austin 
and Travis County websites that track COVID-19’s spread by zip code and demography. 
Specific dashboards for long-term care facilities and community testing rates also 
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are available. Likewise, Central Health and CommUnityCare developed modeling and 
dashboards on their websites to identify COVID-19 hot spots and map testing and 
positivity rates by zip code, race, and ethnicity for the populations they serve. 
Moving forward, policies aimed at reducing health disparities must prioritize cross-sector 
collaborations, improve insurance reimbursements for social services impacting health, 
work to achieve digital inclusion, and enable data sharing and evaluation to improve equity. 
• Increasing Cross-Sector Collaborations. Tackling the social determinants of 
health and resolving health inequities and disparities require partnerships and 
pooling of resources across governments, businesses, nonprofits, academia, and 
others. The Central Health/CommUnityCare Southeast Health and Wellness Center 
in Austin offers free cooking and exercise classes on site and provides space where 
needed social services can co-locate, such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP) and the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program. Foundation 
Communities, an Austin-based nonprofit developer of affordable housing, provides 
wraparound support services to residents of its developments, such as digital literacy, 
tax preparation, and on-site education for children.
Policymakers must build on successful existing collaborations while also forging new 
partnerships, and pursuing opportunities across sectors, from housing, transportation, 
and financial and economic counseling to health care, nutritious food, job training, and 
education. Outreach and engagement must include stakeholders and neighborhoods 
from the outset via surveys, social media, texting platforms, phone calls, emails, 
informal community events, and formal advisory boards so that appropriate services 
can be co-created.
• Improved Reimbursement for Social Services. The pandemic has drawn attention to 
the positive effects social services can have on health. Policies enabling more generous 
payments from insurance companies to social service providers align incentives 
between health care and other industries affecting the social determinants of health. 
More reimbursement would reward nonmedical providers for alleviating social 
problems affecting health and encourage further collaboration between health systems 
and nonmedical evidence-based programs. 
• Digital Inclusion. As evidenced by increases in telehealth services, online job 
training, and virtual learning in K-12 and higher education, the pandemic shed light 
on both the need for and the power of online services to improve health and well-
being. Policymakers must prioritize funding to provide universal access to high-speed 
broadband as an essential utility comparable to water, electricity, and sewers. In 1936, 
the US Congress passed the Rural Electrification Act; the time has come for Congress 
to pass the Universal Broadband Act.
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• More Data Sharing and Evaluation. COVID-19 has illuminated the need for better 
platforms and policies to improve data sharing among local government entities 
and various community health care providers and hospitals. At the local, state, 
and national levels, the lack of consistent, coordinated data has hampered disease 
identification, tracking, and treatment. Additionally, good data must be accompanied 
by specific criteria and outcome measures to evaluate the effectiveness of health care, 
social services, and wraparound service programs. We cannot close the equity gap 
and eliminate disparities unless we have evidence-based, data-driven policies with 
standards and key performance indicators.
As America endures multiple crises, 
President Johnson’s call to action is as 
urgent today as it’s ever been.
As America endures multiple crises, President Johnson’s call to action is as urgent 
today as it’s ever been. The COVID-19 virus has killed more than 200,000 people, while 
a vaccine remains months away. Small businesses are shutting their doors permanently 
while more and more Americans lose jobs amid an economic recession. Under-resourced 
communities have been hit hardest. 
May LBJ’s example guide us as we push for long-overdue policies that can improve health 
and prosperity for all. Only then will we have the healthy and resilient communities we 
need.
Sherri R. Greenberg, MS, is a professor of practice and fellow of the Max Sherman Chair in 
State and Local Government at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas 
at Austin. Michael K. Hole, M.D., M.B.A., F.A.A.P. is founder and executive director of The 
Impact Factory and an assistant professor of Pediatrics, Population Health, and Public 
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 The prenatal period to age three is when the brain and body develop most 
rapidly; as such, it is the most sensitive and critical time in a child’s development. Our 
brain is the only organ that is not fully formed at birth; it requires input from those around 
us to shape it. The science of the developing child is clear: children exposed to stimulating, 
warm, and secure environments in those first three years are set on a path of healthy brain 
development and life-long health and well-being, whereas children exposed to early and 
chronic adversity will struggle throughout the course of their lives. 
Increasingly, state policy leaders recognize that investments in this early period yield 
substantial savings to education, health systems, and other social services over time. They 
are also aware that the failure to ensure that children get off to a strong start levies serious 
short- and long-term costs to children, families, and society. 
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Although the need to invest in this early period is clear, policy leaders lack clear, evidence-
driven guidance as to what the smartest investments are to ensure that infants and 
toddlers thrive. The COVID-19 crisis makes these policy choices even more crucial: families 
with young children are struggling to maintain employment and care for their little ones. 
Huge increases in food insecurity, housing instability, and parental stress have devastating 
consequences for the developing child. Communities of color have borne the brunt of the 
crisis, exacerbating already deep and persistent racial and ethnic inequities in child and 
family well-being. 
The COVID-19 crisis makes
these policy choices even more 
crucial: families with young 
children are struggling to 
maintain employment
and care for their little ones.
The pandemic has exposed the need for a system of care to support families—no one 
institution can do it alone. Health, education, employment, social services, families, 
communities—each of these institutions must work together to ensure that healthy 
children are born to healthy parents, and that parents have the skills, resources, and 
institutional supports they need to work and care for their children’s health and well-being 
and be the parents their children deserve. 
 
The Prenatal-to-3 Policy Impact Center at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The 
University of Texas at Austin developed a State Policy Roadmap to help decision makers 
as they seek to craft policies that enhance the well-being of infants, toddlers, and their 
parents. It identifies five effective state-level policies and six strategies. Rigorous reviews 
of the research confirm that each positively impacts prenatal-to-3 outcomes, and most 
reduce racial and ethnic disparities in outcomes and promote equity.
“
”
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The five policies are broad and promote greater health and economic resources within 
households:
• Expansion of Income Eligibility for Health Insurance. Expanding income eligibility 
for health insurance allows childless adults as well as parents to access health care. 
This is especially important for lower-income women because it provides them with 
access to medical care prior to conception and prenatal care when they need it. 
• Reduction of Administrative Burdens Surrounding Benefits and Services. The 
reduction of administrative burdens ensures that people who are eligible for benefits 
and services receive them. This is the most straightforward policy that states can 
implement. Although adequate safeguards against fraud are required, it is costly to 
require in-person recertification for benefits at short intervals. States have made 
several modifications to their processes in response to COVID-19, and they should 
consider making them permanent so all families who are eligible for services receive 
them.
• Paid Family Leave. Now is also the time for states to implement a paid family leave 
policy, allowing parents to receive a portion of their incomes for at least six weeks 
while they stay at home with their newborns. Paid family leave not only allows time for 
parents to bond with their infants in the critical first months of life, but also increases 
the likelihood that they will return to their pre-birth employer, increasing employment 
over the long-run.
• Increasing State Minimum Wage and Creating a State Version of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC). Increasing the state minimum wage to at least $10 per 
hour and offering a refundable state version of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
that is at least 10 percent of the federal EITC are two additional policies that not only 
substantially increase household resources, but reduce adverse birth outcomes and 
promote health and well-being across early childhood. 
The pandemic has exposed
the need for a system of care
to support families—no one
institution can do it alone.
“
”
 74 • RESILIENCY IN THE AGE OF COVID-19
The six strategies we recommend are also backed up by rigorous research, but we cannot 
provide clear guidance as to what states should do through policy or regulatory action to 
ensure the results found in the causal studies. These strategies include:
• Implementing comprehensive screening and referral programs to identify 
developmental delays in children and connect families with the resources they need to 
help them support their children
• Setting childcare subsidy reimbursement rates at levels that allow families to afford 
high-quality care
• Funding group prenatal care programs to enhance birth outcomes and improve the 
emotional well-being of mothers
• Offering home visiting programs to enhance parenting skills
• Funding Early Head Start programs to increase the number of eligible children 
participating in this effective two-generation program
• Setting broad eligibility criteria for intervention services that identify and address 
early developmental delays in infants and toddlers 
No state is currently implementing all eleven of these solutions, but there are wide 
variations across states in the benefits and services that children and families have access 
to, which lead to huge variations in outcomes. As states attempt to rebuild their health, 
economic, child care, education, and social service systems, this roadmap can help them 
implement the policies that have the biggest impacts, benefiting families in the short term 
and leading to long-term gains for society as a whole. 
Cynthia Osborne, PhD is the associate dean for academic strategies and the director of 
the Prenatal-to-3 Policy Impact Center (pn3policy.org) at the LBJ School of Public Affairs 
at The University of Texas at Austin.
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Correcting Corrections: 
Lessons for Prisons
and Jails in a
Post-COVID World
MICHELE DEITCH
 The COVID crisis has been a wake-up call like no other for our nation’s prisons 
and jails. Even for a government sector accustomed to making headlines for unflattering 
reasons, the virus has presented a string of unceasingly bad news. As of early September 
2020, prisons and jails accounted for 44 of the top 50 coronavirus hotspots in the US.86 
Both their infection rate and their death rate far outpace those in the free community. 
In fact, a study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that 
people in US prisons are 550 percent more likely to contract COVID and 300 percent 
more likely to die from it than their free world counterparts.87  What’s more, the virus’ toll in 
corrections facilities continues to grow, and the curve shows no signs of flattening.
We look to our corrections system as part of our nation’s public safety network, yet 
it seems to be failing terribly at that mission. Not only are incarcerated people—
disproportionately elderly, Black, and with pre-existing medical conditions—getting 
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infected and dying at unprecedented rates, but so are the people who work in these 
facilities.88 And the coronavirus is spreading into nearby communities.89 There have also 
been reports of violence and riots breaking out in facilities where the virus is prevalent 
and where stress levels run high.90 Beyond these physical manifestations of harm, the 
COVID crisis has led to curtailment of rehabilitative programs inside facilities and reduced 
contact between incarcerated people and their families, both of which can contribute to 
higher recidivism rates.
All of this harm was entirely predictable. Experts warned early on that corrections facilities 
would be petri dishes—essentially, cruise ships on steroids. Prisons and jails are densely 
populated facilities where social distancing is all but impossible, with poor sanitary 
conditions and limited access to hygiene and cleaning supplies. They hold increasingly 
high numbers of elderly individuals and those with serious medical conditions. The 
high churn of people in local jails creates a constant risk of spread from the outside to 
the inside and vice versa, and the comings and goings of staff present an ongoing risk 
of exposure for people in custody. In short, incarcerated people are a very vulnerable 
population in a very risky environment, who are unable to protect themselves.
COVID laid bare a multitude of serious 
problems in our system of mass 
incarceration in this country.
COVID laid bare a multitude of serious problems in our system of mass incarceration 
in this country, including the gross racial inequities in who we lock up, the poverty that 
determines whether someone remains jailed or is released, our excessive thirst for 
punishment that requires people to remain incarcerated long past their crime-prone years, 
and the unhealthy and unsafe conditions of confinement in these institutions. 
The Lessons
The pandemic has also driven home some critical lessons. First, there is no bright line 
between our correctional facilities and our communities. What happens behind the 
razor-wire fence doesn’t stay behind the razor-wire fence. Unhealthy prisons and jails 
mean unhealthy communities. What happens inside these facilities matters—and should 
matter—to all of us. Prisons and jails need to be more transparent.
Second, both incarcerated people and staffs have a mutual interest in ensuring safe and 
healthy facilities. Viruses don’t care which side of the metal bars you’re on. 
“
”
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Third, the reason these facilities are so densely populated is that we lock up far too many 
people for far too long. We demand a pound of flesh, even when a person presents no 
further risk to the community or when social services such as mental health treatment, 
drug treatment, housing, or job training would be a better fit. Our deeply punitive policies—
which also play out in the form of dehumanizing conditions behind bars—have stood in the 
way of more thoughtful, appropriate, and cost-effective measures that can save lives. 
 
The COVID crisis offers us an opportunity to learn from these lessons and re-envision 
and transform our corrections system. We must work to create a model that incarcerates 
fewer people, that is fairer and more equitable, and that is less punitive, less traumatizing, 
safer, and healthier for people in custody and their staffs alike. We need to evaluate the 
operations of our prisons and jails through a public health lens and ask questions about 
how our policies and institutions affect the health and well-being of people who are 
incarcerated, as well as their families, their communities, and the staff who supervise 
them. Our goal must be to create more resilient individuals, families, and communities. 
Only in this way can we achieve the public safety mission to which our criminal justice 
system aspires.
The COVID crisis offers us an 
opportunity to learn from these lessons 
and re-envision and transform our 
corrections system.
The Action Plan
Depopulate facilities and avoid unnecessary incarceration. To prevent a COVID 
catastrophe, the number one recommendation of every corrections expert was to 
depopulate prisons and jails to enable at least a modicum of social distancing and to 
better protect the most vulnerable people in custody. While some states and counties 
followed this guidance, most did not, and tragic results predictably followed. 
As we look to a post-COVID world, we need to adhere to this public health guidance. The 
US incarcerates more people than any other country on the planet, and we gain very little 
public safety benefit from the disproportionately long sentences we impose. We should not 
be incarcerating people who do not present a significant risk to our communities. And for 
those we do incarcerate, we should impose shorter sentences and release them when they 
no longer pose risks to public safety. Above all, we need to invest in communities and make 
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To help reduce the populations of prisons and jails (and save taxpayers’ money in the 
process), every jurisdiction should implement these policies at a minimum:
• Law enforcement should expand use of “citation and release” practices to avoid jailing 
people charged with minor offenses.
• Courts should expand the use of personal bonds so no one remains in jail solely 
because they cannot afford to make bail.
• Prosecutors should seek, and judges should impose, significantly shorter sentences; 
sentences of more than twenty years should be reserved for the most extreme cases 
and many more individuals should receive non-custodial sanctions.
• Legislatures should establish routine processes that allow for the early release of 
individuals who no longer present a risk to the community due to their age, health 
condition, or rehabilitation, with no exclusions due to the nature of the crime.
• People approved for parole should be released quickly, rather than being required at 
that point to begin and complete programs prior to their actual release. Such programs 
should be offered at an earlier stage of incarceration, not at the tail end, which simply 
delays release and increases costs for taxpayers. If more programming is necessary 
after the release decision is made, those programs can be completed in the community 
rather than in prison. 
• Legislatures should expand compassionate release programs, including options 
for releasing individuals who are medically vulnerable during a pandemic, with no 
exclusions due to the nature of the crime.
Improve conditions of confinement. Improving conditions in our nation’s prisons and 
jails is no easy task, but we must begin by recognizing the immense harm and trauma 
caused to people who live and work in places that are unhealthy, unsanitary, crowded, 
dangerous, and dehumanizing. The goal of public safety is undermined when people 
emerge from these settings worse than when they entered. We must shift from the 
punitive mindset that says that people should suffer while incarcerated to the perspective 
that separation from the community is punishment enough, and the focus during that time 
should be on building wellness and resiliency. Most immediately, though, the objective is 
harm reduction through the following measures:
• Ensure that incarcerated people have easy access to hygiene and cleaning supplies, 
and that both residents and staff have sufficient PPE.
• Provide more single cell housing, offer privacy partitions in dorms, and eliminate 
crowded congregate housing areas.
• Provide higher-quality, healthier food, including fresh fruit and vegetables, in sufficient 
quantities.
• Recognize the different needs of women in custody and develop separate programs, 
services, and policies to address their needs.
• Eliminate the use of long-term solitary confinement, which has been shown to 
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exacerbate mental health problems.
• Offer work opportunities that teach meaningful skills, and pay incarcerated people for 
their work so they can contribute to their families and save money for their release.
• Provide staff with better working conditions and sufficient pay so they feel safe, do not 
need to work overtime to make up for understaffing, and do not feel tempted to engage 
in illicit activities on behalf of residents.
• Work toward a culture shift that values more normalized, helpful, and trauma-
informed interactions between staff and residents rather than the control-oriented and 
dehumanizing dynamics that mark most correctional environments.
• Expand access to education and the arts, including theatre and music programs; 
establish creative and healthy outlets for residents; and develop programs that provide 
residents with increasing levels of responsibility.
Strengthen relationships between incarcerated people and their families. Successful 
reentry so often relies on healthy family relationships. Yet the barriers to maintaining 
family ties are immense: long distances for families to travel to the facilities for visits, 
massively expensive phone calls, facility lockdowns, bureaucratic restrictions, and 
suspension of visitation due to COVID. To help build the resiliency of families and promote 
public safety, corrections officials should:
• Offer video visitation as a supplement to in-person visitation or as an alternative while 
COVID restrictions are in place.
• Provide increased access to phones for people in custody, including those in restricted 
housing.
• Prohibit predatory pricing for all methods of communication between incarcerated 
people and their families.
• Provide families with routine information about what is happening in the facilities and 
any changes to operational policies that affect their loved ones.
Use technology to expand delivery of programs and services to people in custody. 
COVID restrictions led to the suspension of most programs and many services in prisons 
and jails. Not only does this suspension deny incarcerated people the education and 
treatment programs they need to reduce their likelihood of recidivism, but idleness in 
custody is a recipe for increased misconduct, tension, and violence. Technology offers the 
opportunity to expand these offerings, even after COVID restrictions are lifted, increasing 
safety and security in the facilities and improving the resiliency of people who are 
incarcerated. Corrections officials should explore the potential to:
• Provide residents with computer tablets (with all necessary security precautions 
installed) to enable personalized educational and rehabilitative programming.
• Expand access to health care and mental health care through telehealth and tele-
mental health services.
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Enhance transparency of prisons and jails. Prisons and jails are extraordinarily opaque 
institutions that exercise enormous control over the lives of the people inside them. 
Shining a spotlight on what happens behind bars helps protect incarcerated people, 
provides critical information to policymakers and the media, and helps spread guidance 
about best practices. The American Bar Association has called on every jurisdiction to 
establish independent government bodies to conduct routine monitoring of prisons and 
jails, and has detailed the key elements of effectiveness.91 Yet in contrast to other Western 
nations, the US has few examples of robust independent correctional oversight bodies.92 
Beyond this lack of oversight, we do not even require the reporting of key indicators of 
safety and health behind bars. 
To help ensure safer and healthier prisons and jails, policymakers should: 
  
• Establish one or more independent oversight bodies in every state to conduct routine 
preventive inspections of prisons and jails, and report publicly on the treatment of 
people in custody.
• Require the collection and public reporting of data about health and safety issues in 
prisons and jails.
The ultimate lesson of the COVID crisis in our prisons and jails is this: addressing the 
issues it has surfaced is not just a good idea, it is a moral imperative. We need to have the 
vision and courage to correct corrections and work toward a system that is more worthy of 
our values and ideals—one that uses a public health lens to help build resiliency. For that is 
the true underpinning of a safer community.
Michele Deitch is a distinguished senior lecturer at the LBJ School of Public Affairs (with 
a joint appointment in the School of Law) at The University of Texas at Austin. She is 
currently directing the COVID, Corrections, and Oversight Project at the LBJ School of 
Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin.
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 The RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service, an academic and 
research center in theLBJ School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin, 
recently released the Austin Area Sustainability Indicators annual Austin Futures Report 
focused on community and climate resilience. In it, researchers posed the question: 
“Instead of normalizing and valorizing herculean efforts of historically disadvantaged 
communities, how can resilience interrogate and change inequitable societal 
structures?”93
To prepare for the report, researchers surveyed thirteen Austin-area nonprofit 
organizations. While each organization defined “resilience” differently, all understood the 
interconnected nature of the nine Austin Area Sustainability Indicators, including climate 
and community resilience.94 The nonprofit sector operates in all of these areas, and often 
across more than one at a time. In their responses, all of them stressed the importance of 
collaboration.
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Nonprofits are, at their core and out of necessity, spaces that foster experimentation and 
innovation. As such, they are the perfect sandbox for identifying and addressing potential 
solutions for the inequitable societal structures that crises such as COVID-19 exacerbate. 
Communities in which individuals and nonprofits work together and understand each 
other build robust social networks that serve different populations and collaborate on 
society’s most challenging problems. Successful collaborations between organizations 
and community members (or among different nonprofit organizations) acknowledge the 
strengths and weaknesses of each group, as well as the power that community members 
and groups close to the ground have to recognize problems and to build and deliver joint 
and innovative solutions. 
These social networks should be well-maintained even in normal times, so when 
communities inevitably face unforeseen hardships, relationships are already in place 
to nimbly respond. To build these strong networks, nonprofits and other organizations 
should actively look for opportunities to collaborate with others that share their values 
and mission, as well as the skills, materials, and knowledge that are needed to fill gaps 
in services. Networks built on shared values and strong trust “allow more holistic, 
coordinated, timely, and realistic solutions to rise to the surface,” a critical element in 
addressing crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic.95 
Nonprofits are, at their core and 
out of necessity, spaces that foster 
experimentation and innovation.
Though it is impossible to prepare for every potential crisis, communities in which 
nonprofits have built strong networks can more easily support the individuals who utilize 
their services and each other. This is especially important today, when so many of the 
nonprofits that serve the individuals and communities that are the most impacted by 
COVID-19 are facing financial strains themselves.
Go Austin! Vamos Austin! (GAVA) is a nonprofit that organizes and mobilizes community 
power to reduce barriers to health while increasing institutional capacities to respond to 
the people most impacted by historic inequities. GAVA has invested significant resources 
into the development of a framework and community resilience tool. Its work with 
the University of Texas at Austin, community members, and other local organizations 
demonstrate the power of building and maintaining a variety of relationships within a 
social network. Connections GAVA built over the years with community organizations, 
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such as the Austin Together Fund, the Dell Medical School, and the City of Austin RISE 
program, helped them quickly provide cash assistance to residents hit hardest by the 
COVID-19 crisis in some of Austin’s lowest-income areas. As a grassroots organization 
deeply embedded in the community in which it works, GAVA incorporates its members’ 
experiences, ideas, and values into its programs and services. When the COVID-19 
crisis hit, GAVA worked with a community member who had food handling experience 
and another local nonprofit, Urban Roots, to quickly respond to the need for food 
relief, delivering fresh produce to thirty households. By incorporating key principles, 
such as using a strengths-based approach to their work, recognizing structural 
inequity, prioritizing the interests of residents, and building a broad base of community 
stakeholders, GAVA has woven a safety net for the East Austin area.96 GAVA operates off 
the People’s Institute principle that everyone in a community is a gatekeeper of a unique 
set of information and resources.97 Based in transparency and common interests, those 
relationships allow it to leverage resources and build authentic leadership and social 
power. 
To build these strong networks,
nonprofits and other organizations 
should actively look for opportunities to 
collaborate with others that share their 




Drawing on both our survey and the broader lessons learned from the COVID-19 crisis, our 
report underlines some of the most important efforts that stakeholders such as UT Austin 
and the nonprofit community at large should undertake going forward. These include the 
need to:   
• Establish and maintain open channels of communication and encourage 
collaboration between institutions of higher education and their local nonprofit 
community. Establish programs or structures to identify skilled students and alumni 
and match them with nonprofits in the community. As natural community hubs and 
accelerators of talent, our Texas higher education institutions are well-connected to 
talented individuals and are uniquely positioned to match them with nonprofits that 
have needs in areas such as data and financial management, research, grant writing 
and fundraising, and strategic planning. 
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• Direct funding toward data collection, management, and analysis projects. 
Nonprofits often have difficulty securing adequate funding to support data projects due 
to their high demands on personnel and the low initial ROI. Over time, however, quality 
data collection and analysis help nonprofits better understand their communities and 
the impacts of their services, as well as their existing gaps in services. 
• Listen to communities to develop and implement plans for restructuring, 
rebuilding, and revitalizing in the light of a crisis. Grassroots organizers and 
community-led organizations know the territory: be sure to engage them when 
preparing for and responding to crises, and when working to revitalize and heal 
afterwards. 
• Build relationships and networks with nonprofits that serve rural populations. 
The Greater Austin area recognizes thousands of 501(c)(3) nonprofits, ranging from 
small, one-staff operations to local branches of national organizations. Nonprofits in 
urban areas have more opportunities to build networks with each other, institutions of 
higher education, and corporate partners than those that operate in rural areas. The 
Texas nonprofit community will become more robust and sustainable to the extent that 
it brings rural nonprofits into its networks. Organizations can learn from each other, 
share resources and best practices, and help build a statewide network to protect 
communities and regions that may be harder hit by crises such as the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
A recent series of case studies from the RGK Center and other community partners 
highlighted the impact that nonprofits have on local economies. One case study found 
that a nonprofit organization investing in workforce development in Southeast Texas 
successfully trained more than 1,000 previously unemployed individuals and placed many 
in jobs within the local oil and gas sector.98 This emphasis on human and community 
development leads to more successful economic development—a critical aspect of Texas 
communities’ efforts to rebuild and bounce back in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis.
To the extent that nonprofits strengthen their networks with each other and the 
communities they work with, they can redouble their impacts, interrogating and changing 
inequitable social structures for the better. 
Sydney Wilburn is a senior outreach program coordinator at the LBJ School of Public 
Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin. She provides program support and manages 
communications at the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service. Alyssa 
Studer is a program coordinator at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, where she manages 
the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service’s CONNECT program. Moira 
Porter is associate director of the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service. 
David W. Springer is a distinguished teaching professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs 
and directs the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service.









 Foreign-born residents of the United States, a record 44.8 million of them as of 
2018, make up 14.5 percent of the US population and 17.4 percent of the labor force—fully 
28.4 million workers. According to Joint Economic Committee statistics, immigrants99 and 
their children account for more than half of the growth of the US workforce over the past 
two decades.100
Immigrants fuel prosperity and enrich America’s cultural life, making the nation more 
vibrant and more resilient. Policies that support immigrant incorporation would not 
only strengthen the US, but would also help it rebound faster from the COVID health 
emergency and ensuing economic recession.
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Disproportionate Impact of COVID on Immigrants
 
Recently published analysis finds that foreign-born workers are more likely than native-
born workers to be employed in “essential critical infrastructure” sectors as designated 
by the Department of Homeland Security, 69 percent and 65 percent, respectively. They 
are primarily found in two critical sectors: health care providers and the food supply 
chain. Foreign-born workers account for 38 percent of home health aides, 29 percent of 
physicians, and 23 percent of pharmacists. About 22 percent of workers involved in the US 
food supply chain, approximately 2.1 million of them, are also foreign-born. These include 
37 percent of meat processing workers, 30 percent of workers in commercial bakeries, and 
30 percent of agricultural workers.  About three-quarters of unauthorized foreign nationals 
in the labor force are classified as essential.101 
Immigrants are over-represented in the biomedical sector, making up 22 percent of 
scientific researchers in fields that pertain to treatments and vaccines for COVID-19. As of 
2018, almost 40 percent of US medical and life scientists were foreign-born, as were nearly 
30 percent of chemists and material scientists. From 2010 to 2019, the US Department of 
Labor approved more than 11,000 hires of temporary foreign workers at the eight major 
US companies researching coronavirus cures and treatments.102 
A growing body of research finds
that immigrant incorporation increases 
social cohesion, yielding positive 
outcomes for both native- and
foreign-born residents.
COVID-19 has had a disproportionate impact on immigrants when it comes to job 
losses. Historically, immigrant males were more likely to be employed than native males. 
This changed in April 2020, when service occupations, in which foreign-born workers 
are overrepresented, reached unemployment rates of 27 percent, the highest of any 
occupational category.103  
 
Foreign-born residents who are not naturalized US citizens—that is, lawful permanent 
residents, legal temporary residents, and unauthorized residents—have long faced legal 
and practical barriers to receiving health insurance, supportive services, and public 
assistance. Recent regulations promulgated by the Trump Administration have had a 
chilling effect on immigrants seeking benefits, such as Medicaid, for which they are 
eligible. Some did not apply for them, lest they draw attention to family members who are 
unauthorized residents. Concerns that immigrants would not seek testing and needed 
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medical care were such that the US District Court of New York enjoined implementation of 
this new rule during the pandemic.104
COVID relief legislation—the Cares Act of 2020—expressly barred immigrant families 
with an unauthorized family member from receiving stimulus payments. An estimated 
6.2 million essential workers (with 3.8 million children who are US citizens) were denied 
payments under this rule because they either were unauthorized or were filing jointly 
with one of the estimated 5.5 million unauthorized residents who work in jobs deemed 
essential.105 
Immigrant Incorporation Is Key to Resilience
A growing body of research finds that immigrant incorporation increases social cohesion, 
yielding positive outcomes for both native- and foreign-born residents. How well 
immigrants adapt to this is highly dependent on their starting points—the racial and ethnic 
groups they belong to, their legal status, social class, and the geographic area into which 
they integrate. Both native- and foreign-born residents participate in the societal dynamic 
of incorporation, and governmental policies can support or limit immigrants’ feelings of 
acceptance and belonging.106 
Overall, the impact of immigration is a net positive for job creation and economic 
growth, although the wages of US workers may flatten in some instances. Concerns 
that immigrants displace native workers are countered by research showing immigrant 
workers are more often complementary than they are competitors. A quarter of new US 
businesses are started by immigrants. Nationwide, three million immigrant entrepreneurs 
employ almost eight million American workers. Immigrants’ spending power—estimated 
to be $9.3 billion in 2014—helps fuel aggregate demand and economic growth.107
A growing body of research reveals the many ways immigrants have revitalized American 
cities and towns since the 1965 Immigration Act removed the racial and national quotas 
that had been in effect since the 1920s. Immigrants have repopulated abandoned 
neighborhoods and reopened storefront businesses in dormant commercial areas. 
After years of crippling divestment, job loss, and crime, large American cities are once 
again hubs for the national economy, with lower crime rates and prime real estate. Some 
attributed this revitalization to an elite, creative class of young professionals, who began 
returning to cities in significant numbers in the 1990s. A.K. Sandoval-Strausz’s case 
studies of Chicago and Dallas, however, found this reversal is largely due to Latin American 
immigrants. Jackelyn Hwang’s analysis of twenty-three major US cities found that Asian 
and Hispanic immigrants formed “global neighborhoods” that spurred gentrification in 
some neighborhoods and ethnic enclaves in others.108
Federal law controls the legal landscape of immigration, but the particulars of a locale 
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often drive immigrant incorporation. Abigail Fisher Williamson explores why and how 
local governments across the country are taking steps to accommodate immigrants, 
sometimes in the face of formidable opposition. Manuel Pastor and John Mollenkopf 
also emphasize the importance of local leadership in shaping attitudes and responses to 
immigrants.109
Civic engagement is a core component of immigrant incorporation that is promoted by 
interactions with elected officials and helpful neighbors, volunteer work with community 
groups, and discussions of political topics with family, friends, and colleagues. Michael 
Jones Correa has done several studies of immigrant integration; his most recent found 
that immigrants were more civically engaged in 2017 than in earlier years. The penultimate 
of civic engagement is naturalization, and then voting. Naturalization produces a host of 
positive results, such as increased wages, better job opportunities, and an enhanced sense 
of security.110
Key Policy Reform Is Needed at the Federal and Local Levels
To ensure successful immigrant incorporation, efforts should be made at both the federal 
and the local levels. Only the federal government, specifically the US Congress, has the 
power to remedy the issues pertaining to immigrants’ legal statuses, authorization to 
work in the United States, eligibility for federal services, and criteria for naturalization. 
Local governments are better situated to improve the social integration of the immigrants, 
ensure access to educational assets (e.g., schools, libraries, and community centers), and 
encourage naturalization.
Although comprehensive immigration reform is the mantra across the coalition of 
immigration advocates who work in ethnic communities, business groups, labor unions, 
and religious organizations, the experience of the COVID pandemic has lifted several 
policy options to the top of the list. The first would be to offer lawful immigration status 
to unauthorized foreign nationals who worked in essential jobs during the national 
health emergency. The second would be to relax the bars that prevent lawful permanent 
residents from receiving means-tested federal assistance. Both options are imperfect and 
fail to address the extent of the problems with current immigration law, but they would be 
strategic starting points to move comprehensive immigration reform forward. 
Two other important immigration reform provisions are “low-hanging fruit” for lawmakers 
supporting immigrant incorporation. One would provide lawful permanent residence to 
foreign nationals brought to the United States without legal status as children (also known 
as DACA) who meet specified conditions. The other would enable certain international 
students who graduated from US institutions with advanced degrees in the sciences, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics to qualify for lawful permanent residence. 
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Civic engagement is a core component of 
immigrant incorporation that is promoted by 
interactions with elected officials and helpful 
neighbors, volunteer work with community 
groups, and discussions of political topics 
with family, friends, and colleagues.
An option that would certainly foster immigrant incorporation would be the elimination 
of the $1,600 fee that lawful permanent residents must pay to apply for naturalization. 
Encouraging and supporting naturalization is clearly in the national interest. Using 
appropriated funds to cover the adjudication costs of citizenship applications is a 
straightforward way to support naturalization.111
At the local level, there is much that municipal governments and community organizations 
can do to foster immigration incorporation. Research I led with LBJ graduate students in 
Dallas, Texas, resulted in three recommendations for local policy-makers:
• To exercise leadership on immigrant incorporation
• To promote policies fostering economic development and civic engagement among 
immigrants
• To support programs that enhance education outcomes, neighborhood livability, and 
access to legal, health and human services for immigrant communities.112 
In sum, the public policies that aim to incorporate immigrants boost resiliency for all 
residents, native- and foreign-born.
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Toward a More Inclusive 
and Resilient Economic 
Development Paradigm
STEVEN W. PEDIGO
 The economic development field has never faced bigger challenges—or 
higher stakes. With the coronavirus pandemic still raging out of control, unemployment 
remains stubbornly high, local governments are rapidly running out of money, and 
small businesses are closing in droves. Meanwhile, our hyper-polarized political climate, 
renewed awareness of racial inequality, and the increasingly frequent and severe wildfires, 
hurricanes, storms, and other natural disasters are heightening tensions across society. 
America’s deep inequities and vulnerabilities are as raw and exposed as they’ve ever been. 
As business activity resumes, we can no longer push these problems under the rug 
while debating or denying their existence. Our communities, our way of life, and our 
economy are being reshaped by these forces, whether we like it or not. The most obvious 
and immediate changes we are experiencing stem from the rise of remote work and 
the shifting economic geography it is creating: some people will be drawn to rural and 
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suburban areas for more private space, while others will be more attracted to central 
cities, which are all of a sudden more affordable. The question now is whether community 
and business leaders can leverage these changes for resilient and inclusive growth. 
For too long, the word “resilience” has been used solely in the context of environmental 
disasters or unnatural catastrophes, like terrorism or toxic oil spills. But resilience needs 
to be considered more expansively, as a place’s capacity to weather economic and 
public health threats, and even more broadly, “as the capacity of residents, communities, 
institutions, businesses, and systems to survive, adapt, and grow,” no matter what kinds 
of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience.113 The more resilience a community 
has, the less likely it is to break under pressure—and the faster and more completely it can 
rebound from crisis.  
Achieving a more resilient and equitable future won’t be easy, but there are strategies and 
actions that economic development leaders can adopt that will set that process in motion. 
Among these new “plays”: 
The more resilience a community 
has, the less likely it is to break under 
pressure—and the faster and more 
completely it can rebound from crisis.
Expand cooperation among government jurisdictions, businesses, and community 
organizations. As economic geographies are reshuffled, cities in affected regions will 
need to more closely align their provision of services, including transportation, education, 
and health care. Public-private relationships that developed during the pandemic to 
provide testing and PPE can be strengthened and redirected toward other goals, including 
workforce development, traffic demand management, and other public health initiatives. 
Anchor institutions like hospitals and universities can expand their leadership by 
partnering with governments, local businesses, and community groups to fulfill regional 
economic and social needs. Successful collaborations shouldn’t end once a vaccine 
becomes widely available. 
Rethink the role of commercial and entertainment districts. With many companies 
saying they will be leasing less office space in the future, and lingering anxiety about 
public transit and large public gathering places, the neighborhoods where these 
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activities take place will need to diversify their offerings. Encouraging mixed-use 
development in downtown office cores, satellite office parks, and entertainment districts 
will help keep these neighborhoods vibrant even if their core functions are diminished. 
Zoning restrictions could be loosened and financial incentives provided for residential 
conversions. Economic development officials should also consider diversifying the 
business clusters that exist in their cities, so that if one sector is particularly hard-hit, the 
whole regional economy will not be devastated.
Foster resilience through economic inclusion and diversification. Small businesses 
in particular need extra help during this uncertain time. Too often, city regulations hamper 
small businesses through onerous permitting processes; many cities are beginning to strip 
those processes away. Governments, anchor institutions, and large businesses can also 
develop targeted investment programs to help historically marginalized and underserved 
businesses, similar to anchor collaboratives and local purchasing programs. While 
business attraction is always important, economic development officials also need to look 
at ways to retain and expand existing businesses. This can be done through the framework 
of collaboration and partnership described above. 
Invest in the skills of all residents. Cities need to align economic development and 
workforce priorities, creating new pipelines of workers into strategic, talent-hungry 
sectors. Job training and workforce development should leverage the latest technologies 
to ensure workers are being trained for the jobs of the future. Likewise, these programs 
should provide wraparound services, including childcare and mentoring, all in the same 
location, to make it easier for the people who need them the most to take full advantage of 
them. 
Support essential workers to address inequities. While they’ve always been essential, 
it’s now clear to everyone just how important “essential workers” are to the functioning of 
society. These workers need to be treated with dignity and supported so they can bring 
their best to the job. Safety nets like paid sick leave, living wages, and childcare will help 
fill labor shortages and improve worker performance, as well as serving as social well-
being indicators. Cities, businesses, and anchor institutions should consider the “good 
jobs strategy” developed by Zeynep Ton at MIT and pursued by successful companies like 
H-E-B, Costco, and Trader Joes, in which low-paid service jobs are transformed into viable 
careers to the benefit of both employees and employers.114 
Increase health care investments for economic development. As the pandemic has 
demonstrated, health care is a vital form of economic development. Cities and states 
should accept federal dollars for Medicaid expansion and invest them in new clinics and 
health care jobs. Health care facilities and systems will likely need to change a great 
deal to accommodate tele-health and other post-pandemic realities, so investments 
in infrastructure and IT will be essential. There will be major opportunities for the 
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As important and urgent as it is for
local leaders to get our communities 
up and running again, the ultimate 
challenge is to make them stronger, 
more resilient, and more equitable
companies—and regions—that invest in these technologies. There will also be many more 
job opportunities in the health care field, meaning job-training and workforce development 
initiatives should target their efforts in that direction. 
Promote growth in smaller and rural communities. A select few rural communities 
and small towns have become magnets for remote workers, causing the problems that 
come along with prosperity, like rapidly rising housing prices and strains on local services. 
However, far more rural communities and small towns have weak economies with few 
prospects for growth. A broader, more regional focus would help these communities 
establish better infrastructure, and educational, economic, and health care links to nearby 
cities and towns. Regions should plan for export sectors that could suit rural areas that 
have cheap, abundant land, and develop talent initiatives that encourage young people 
who’ve sought opportunity elsewhere to return home.
Invest in equitable placemaking centered on well-being. The pandemic is 
transforming our public spaces. Many of the temporary changes cities have adopted, 
including outdoor dining and shared streets, should be made permanent. Streets (and 
neighbors) can adapt more quickly and seamlessly than previously imagined, so cities 
should be bold about prioritizing the most enjoyable, environmentally friendly, healthy, 
and economically vibrant uses for public space. These spaces are essential for bridging 
differences across society, celebrating different cultures and communities, and bringing 
diverse groups together as one. The economic challenges posed by the pandemic also 
highlight the need to keep cities affordable for the working class. Community land trusts 
and land banks are another creative way that cities can increase public space in the name 
of affordability and equity. 
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As important and urgent as it is for local leaders to get our communities up and running 
again, the ultimate challenge is to make them stronger, more resilient, and more equitable 
than they have been in the past. COVID-19 and other recent events have exposed our 
existing weaknesses and blind spots, but they also point us to a better way forward. 
Economic development leaders now have an incredible opportunity to make their cities 
and regions more resilient in the face of future shocks. Cities that don’t act now will be left 
behind—not if, but when the next crisis strikes.  
Steven W. Pedigo is a professor of practice at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The 
University of Texas at Austin. He directs the School’s Urban Lab.
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Climate
Change
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Bouncing Forward: 
How Lessons From the 
Pandemic Can Help Us 
Adapt to Climate Change
R. PATRICK BIXLER, PAOLA 
PASSALACQUA, REGINA M. BUONO
 As decision makers and communities struggle with the impacts of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the very meaning of recovery has come into question. Is the aim 
simply to return to normal (i.e., to bounce back)? Or can we think about bouncing forward 
to a new and better normal? If so, how can we transform our policies, practices, and 
systems to be more equitable and resilient? The answers to these questions point the way 
toward what we need to do to prepare for the inevitable climate disasters that are to come. 
The pandemic’s impacts have been unequally distributed across neighborhoods, 
communities, and social groups.115  Infection, hospitalization, and death rates are 
significantly higher in Black, Hispanic, and resource-poor communities. Blacks have been 
infected at almost four times the rate of whites, have 4.2 times as many hospitalizations, 
and twice as many deaths. The hospitalization rate for Latinx persons is approximately 
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4.4 times that of non-Hispanic persons,116 and Hispanic Americans saw the steepest 
employment losses and have the most ground to make up to reach pre-pandemic 
employment levels.117 The COVID recession is the most unequal in modern US history. 
Millions of low-paid service workers were exposed to the virus in their work or lost their 
jobs because of the lockdown, while professionals have been able to work at home, and the 
stock market has continued to climb.
All this speaks to the notion of social vulnerability, which is well-understood in climate-
related hazards research. For example, the Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) and its variants 
combine multiple socio-demographic dimensions to generate a spatially explicit index 
that indicates the places most susceptible to the impacts of shocks like wildfire, extreme 
heat, drought, hurricanes, and flooding (to see Texas-specific estimates at the Census 
Tracts and Census Block Group visit: https://tmo.utexas.edu/texas-social-vulnerability). 
As with the pandemic, those stressors have unequal impacts across society. Policies and 
programmatic interventions can be designed to build community resilience in three broad 
ways, by:
• Reducing sensitivities
• Reducing hazard exposure
• Increasing adaptive capacity 
Increasing resilience across a range of multiple hazards requires researchers, 
policymakers, and community leaders to work together in ways that are problem-focused 
and solution-based and aimed at equitably reducing disaster loss and promoting collective 
well-being. A resilient Texas— from neighborhoods to cities and across vastly different 
geographies—will be dependent on an enhanced understanding of the complex and 
nonlinear interactions of natural and social systems and the mechanisms to translate 
these new scientific discoveries to actionable and policy-relevant practices. 
Given that the COVID-19 crisis has affected these same social and economic systems, 
what insights can we generate from the experience that might better help us prepare for 
the coming climate crisis? Below, we identify and discuss four key issues: 
Social and Spatial Inequality
As previously mentioned, a prominent feature of climate hazards research is the different 
sensitivities of populations to shocks or stressors, referred to in shorthand as their “social 
vulnerability.” If past is prologue, socially vulnerable neighborhoods and communities in 
Texas and beyond will be the first and hardest-hit by consequences of climate change, just 
as they were by COVID-19. 
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Economic and social policy that seeks to address historical and systemic inequality can 
reduce vulnerability in low resource groups. Municipal and state policy can also direct 
infrastructure investment, both gray and green, to these communities in ways that reduce 
their exposure to hazards. For example, improved drainage and enhancements to the 
natural absorption capacity of cityscapes can reduce acute flooding in socially vulnerable 
places. Additionally, policies and programs that build social capital—the networks, 
norms, and social cohesion of households and neighborhoods—should be advocated 
and promoted because they increase the capacity for households and neighborhoods to 
adapt. The City of Austin’s climate ambassador program provides one innovative approach 
for building social capital. 118
Improved Preparation and Response
COVID-19 and climate change have similar nonlinear and temporal impact dynamics that 
are best understood through scientific modeling. Such models allow us to prepare for 
disasters and take proactive steps to mitigate them, potentially reducing their economic 
and human costs. Such models are hard for the public and even policymakers to 
understand, as they frequently challenge short-term thinking and interests. So, scientists 
can help catalyze strong and early action by improving their models provides one 
innovative approach for building social capital—particularly in ways that better integrate 
technical and social dimensions—and increasing the public’s trust in those models. 
For example, flooding preparation and response are limited because the flood and risk 
maps in general use typically do not account for the interactions of pluvial, fluvial, terrain, 
and transportation “layers” that interact with each other, causing significant losses and 
displacements. Also, there are few, if any, established methodologies or workflows to link 
technical models to social dynamics. Combining social “layers” with technical modeling 
can significantly enhance the ability of state agencies and local communities to plan, 
respond, and adapt effectively to evolving risks, using accurate, accessible, and evidence-
based tools.
Critically, we must improve the trust and actionability of new scientific insights and 
discoveries. One approach for doing this is knowledge co-production and collaborative/
participatory modeling. Co-production—a process that iteratively connects ways of 
knowing and acting, including ideas, norms, practices, and discourses—involves multiple 
participants (scientists, policymakers, community groups, and residents) to produce new 
knowledge and new ways of integrating knowledge into decision-making and action. Fine-
resolution flood models can serve as a focal point for stakeholders across multiple levels 
as they build useful knowledge and tools to address flooding and other hazards. 
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Strengthened Multilevel Governance Mechanisms
COVID-19 is the first crisis in the current era of globalization in which nations across the 
world, and states within the US, are competing directly for the same limited resources. 
From Western Europe’s closed borders, to mandated quarantines for out-of-region 
residents entering New York to the closure of Interstate 10 at the Texas/Louisiana border, 
institutions that have long thrived on integration show signs of fragmentation. Climate 
change will bring a repeat of this scenario, but at a potentially greater scale. Increasingly 
frequent extreme weather events and food and water shortages within the US and beyond 
will cause competition for resources, and mass migration will test the limits of global 
integration. 
The fragmentation of governance during COVID-19 can provide insights into the need to 
strengthen multilevel risk governance networks. Understanding and managing risk are 
embedded in a multilevel governance context in which decision making at local scales 
is enabled and constrained by policy decisions and institutions at regional and national 
scales. Investments that build and strengthen these networks will make our communities, 
cities, and states more resilient. 
Soon, we will have ‘recovered’ from the 
COVID-19 pandemic, but will we have 
transformed the policies, practices, 





Disasters occur at the interface of social, natural, and technical (or built) environments. 
Researchers approach the modeling of hazard events (pandemic, flood, heat, drought) 
through different disciplines and technical approaches; however, increasing resilience 
across a range of multiple hazards demands a transdisciplinary effort that facilitates 
cross-hazard-type learning across the disaster life-cycle of preparedness, response, 
recovery, and transformation. Soon, we will have “recovered” from the COVID-19 
pandemic, but will we have transformed the policies, practices, and systems that were 
responsible for our flawed response? Will we have replaced it with one that reduces 
social vulnerability, improves the actionability of science, and strengthens multilevel 
governance? Definitions of transformation vary but generally they share one basic idea: a 
fundamental change in a system and its form, structure, meaning, or relationships.  
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Bouncing Forward
The Covid-19 crisis showed us how a shock can lead to global disruption. And COVID 
wasn’t 2020’s only shock: the year has seen a record number of wildfires in Australia 
and the US, a record number of hurricanes in the Atlantic basin, extreme heat across 
the American Southwest, and what looks to be record global temperatures. We need 
effective policies that help cities, communities, and households adapt to climate change. 
Transformative adaptation requires a long-term vision of what is resilient. We can use 
the COVID-19 crisis to bounce forward and implement strategies that reduce social 
vulnerability, improve preparation and response, strengthen multilevel networks and 
institutions, and otherwise guide a system-wide transformation.
R. Patrick Bixler is an assistant professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The 
University of Texas at Austin. He leads the Austin Area Sustainability Indicators program 
and co-leads the Planet Texas 2050 Flagship initiative Networks for Hazard Preparedness 
and Response. Paola Passalacqua is an associate professor of environmental and water 
resources engineering at The University of Texas at Austin and the co-leader of the Planet 
Texas 2050 Flagship Networks for Hazards Preparedness and Response. Regina M. Buono 
is a PhD candidate in public policy at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The University of 
Texas at Austin and a nonresident scholar at the Center for Energy Studies (CES) at Rice 
University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.
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An Action Plan 
for Protecting the 
Sustainability of Engineered 
Rivers in Arid Lands
JURGEN SCHMANDT,
GEORGE WARD
 A system—natural or social—is resilient if it can recover from illness, 
change, or misfortune. A system is sustainable if it can function successfully after natural 
or social conditions have changed. The two terms have similar meanings. We can say, 
“A system is sustainable if it is resilient,” or “A resilient system is sustainable.” In the 
work reported here, we focus on the sustainability of engineered hydrological systems 
in arid environments—the challenges they face and how to protect and restore their 
sustainability.
Twenty years ago, we convened a team of Mexican and US experts to assess the future of 
the Lower Rio Grande (Figure 1), the 1,000-kilometer-long river segment on the US-Mexico 
border, which supports intensive irrigated agriculture. 119
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Major changes in laws, technology, and management are needed to cope with a predicted 
30 percent loss of available water by 2030. The main reasons for water loss are: 
• Sedimentation, which reduces the storage volume of reservoirs
• Climate change, which lessens rainfall and increases evaporation 
• Outdated irrigation technologies, which use too much water 
• Broken distribution systems, which cause massive water losses
Figure 1: Hydrological and Impact Region in the Lower Rio Grande
To cope with these challenges, we recommended that irrigation districts and farmers, 
the key actors in the impact region,  adopt less water-intensive irrigation technologies 
and shift to less water-demanding crops. This would maintain economic sustainability. 
Environmental sustainability, on the other hand, would require additional actions.
In 2014, with funding from the Mitchell Foundation, we convened a workshop in Austin 
to find out whether other rivers worldwide face similar problems. Experts from different 
continents attended, reported on the challenges faced in their river basins, and expressed 
interest in joining an international project to define appropriate response strategies.
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The resulting project, Sustainability of Engineered Rivers in Arid Lands—SERIDAS, brought 
together an expert for each of ten rivers, as well as specialists studying key factors that 
impact river hydrology. The name SERIDAS is inspired by ARIDAS, an earlier project which 
studied the devastating impacts of droughts in Northeast Brazil. Antonio Magalhães 
directed ARIDAS. Schmandt participated in his project and Magalhães became a founding 
member of SERIDAS.
The SERIDAS team met for additional workshops in Germany, supported by the 
Volkswagen Foundation, and Italy, supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. Two policy 
research projects at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin 
also contributed to the project.120 We published preliminary results in 2017.121 In June 2020, 
we submitted a nineteen-chapter manuscript to Cambridge University Press. We expect 
the book to be published in 2021.122 In the following pages we summarize our findings and 
recommendations. 
The rivers included in the project are Nile, Euphrates-Tigris, Yellow, Murray-Darling, São 
Francisco, Limari, Colorado, Rio Grande, and Jucar (Figure 2).  They are representative of 
irrigation-intensive rivers worldwide (Figure 3). According to the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization, irrigation from rivers and aquifers accounts for 40 percent of global crop 
production.123
The physical systems of the ten rivers share important characteristics. Mountainous 
headwaters (Himalaya, Andes, Rocky Mountains, etc.) provide reliable river flow from 
glaciers, snowpack, or rainfall. Hundreds of kilometers downstream, the local climate is 
arid or semi-arid, but the soil is fertile as a result of millennia of sediment accumulation 
from annual spring floods. Irrigated agriculture has long taken advantage of these 
conditions, in the process giving birth to ancient civilizations—Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, 
and the Americas—that flourished over thousands of years.  
Over the course of the last century, large-scale engineering enhanced this age-old system. 
Dams, bypass canals, and distribution channels were built to generate electricity, increase 
food production, control flooding, and supply water to riverine cities. The first engineered 
dam, completed in 1902, was built on the Nile. This was followed by two dams on the 
Rio Grande, opened in 1914 and 1916. Since then, all of the SERIDAS rivers followed suit, 
building one or several modern reservoirs.
Major changes in laws, technology,
and management are needed to cope
with a predicted 30 percent loss
of available water by 2030.
“
”
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This brought multiple benefits to farmers, cities, and the world. Yet engineered rivers in 
arid lands face serious challenges. Climate change reduces the timing and volume of 
snowpack. Climate variability increases the frequency and severity of droughts. Higher 
temperatures increase water evaporation. Fertile sediment no longer reaches agricultural 
land. Instead, siltation reduces the storage volume of reservoirs. Chemical fertilizers and 
urban runoff impair water quality. Overwatering increases soil salinity. Native species 
suffer from reduced river flow and modifications in the river hydrograph. 
Figure 2: The SERIDAS Rivers
The best response to these challenges requires changes in water management. Managers, 
using the longest period of record available, should determine how engineered rivers in 
arid regions have met social and environmental needs during periods of low river flow 
or drought. This dependable yield—a mathematical construct based on the constant 
volume of withdrawn water that can be met without failure—serves as the single most 
important management tool for controlling reservoir performance and is often used as a 
basis for allocation of water from a reservoir system.124 It should be carefully monitored 
and recalculated whenever natural or social conditions in the basin reduce water supply or 
increase water use. Based on the concept of dependable yield we propose this action plan 
for protecting or restoring the sustainability of reservoir-dominated rivers in arid lands:125
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Figure 3: Irrigation-Intensive Rivers Worldwide
• Water managers determine that nature’s water supply, averaged over the period of the 
most severe drought experienced in the historical record, delivers a dependable yield 
sufficient to meet human and ecological needs in the basin. 
• If this is not the case, water managers and users proactively search for ways to use 
water more efficiently.
• Whenever observed or projected changes in the natural system or human actions 
modify river flow, the dependable yield is redetermined, and water managers—after 
consultation with water stakeholders—adjust existing rules for water allocation and 
water use to match the new level of dependable yield.  
• Further adjustments are made to maintain/restore an ecologically prudent level of in-
stream flow. 
We conclude with three sobering comments to remind us of the big obstacles that stand in 
the way of meeting these sustainability goals:
Management Practices. Each of our four recommendations calls for a departure from 
the usual management practices in most river basins. We invite river managers to adjust 
their views and procedures so that sustainability becomes their principle goal.
Conjunctive Management. Sustainable water management requires a consideration of 
the connections between river water and groundwater. Existing law in some river regions, 
for example the Texas part of the Rio Grande basin, makes this goal difficult to reach. We 
urge movement toward conjunctive management of surface and groundwater. 
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Sustainable water management 
requires a consideration of the 
connections between river
water and groundwater.
Water Conflicts. Where water becomes the core of, the trigger to, and a weapon in active 
conflict, the goal of sustainable water supply and demand is unattainable. For example, 
sub-state level conflicts and illegal control of water resources and water infrastructure 
deprive people from access to sufficient clean water, energy, and food resources in 
the Euphrates-Tigris region. The lack of water undermines the search for sustainable 
development and causes agricultural, economic, and political decline. Sustainability 
in a river basin requires stability as well as participatory, transparent, inclusive, and 
accountable governance structures. 
Only when these issues are addressed can rivers cope with the looming problems of 
water scarcity, climate change and variation, reservoir sedimentation, population growth, 
economic losses, food security, and ecological damage. 
The SERIDAS project did not address the impact of the corona virus on water resources, 
but a European study suggests the following connections:
• Conventional drinking water treatment should be effective, via common disinfectants 
used in the Water Sector (which already target viruses).
• Conventional wastewater treatment is likely not fully effective, since chemical 
disinfection, like chlorination or ultraviolet light, is necessary to eliminate viruses.
• Presence/survival of viruses in surface waters is moderate to low because sunlight, 
oxidative chemicals, and predation by microorganisms threaten the survival of viruses 
in the natural state. But treatment is recommended for drinking water.
Jurgen Schmandt is professor emeritus at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at The 
University of Texas at Austin. He simultaneously served as director of the Mitchell Center 
for Global Change, Houston Advanced Research Center. George Ward is retired from the 
University of Texas Center for Water and the Environment, where he served as associate 
director and continues to perform research on the mechanics of watercourses. 
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